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"All models are wrong but some are useful."
George Box'
"'The matter does not appear to me now as it appears
to have appeared to me then. '2
INTRODUCTION 3
In 1994 and 1996, I published articles that set forth a system for
describing mediators' approaches to mediation; the system employed
a "grid" consisting of two intersecting continuums. 4 One continuum
represented the mediator's notion of the mediator's role; the con-
cepts of "facilitative" and "evaluative" provided its anchors. The other
dealt with the mediator's customary approach to problem-definition,
and it ran from "narrow" to "broad." When these continuums inter-
sected, as shown in Figure 1, they produced quadrants, which I said
represented mediators' "orientations" toward mediation.
By offering this system, I hoped to help clarify discussions of me-
diation, which until that time had often been suffused with ambiguity,
for this reason: an enormous range of diverse processes were called
1 G.E.P. Box, Robustness in the Strategy of Scientific Model Building, in ROBUSTNESS IN
STATISTICS 201, 202 (Robert L. Launer & Graham N. Wilkinson eds., 1979).
2 McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 178 (Jackson, J., concurring) (quoting
Baron Bramwell in Andrews v. Styrap, 26 L.T.R. (N.S.) 704, 706 (1872)).
3 Some brief, preliminary thoughts on the topic addressed in this Article
appeared in Leonard L. Riskin, Who Decides What? Rethinking the Grid of Mediator
Orientations, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2003, at 22 [hereinafter Riskin, Who Decides
What?], and Leonard L. Riskin, Retiring and Replacing the Grid of Mediator Orientations,
21 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 69 (2003) [hereinafter Riskin, Retiring and
Replacing]. After I published those articles, a colleague helped me recognize the
difficulty of explaining what I called the "meta-process." Accordingly, in this Article, I
present a newer, less ambiguous approach, which I call the "New New Grid System,"
and I adopt clearer descriptive terms.
I hope the following description of my writings on mediation grids, with current
labels, will minimize potential confusion. What I now call the "Old Grid" appeared in
Leonard L. Riskin, Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Techniques, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COST LITIG. 111 (1994) [hereinafter Riskin, Mediator Orientations], and in
Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A
Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 7 (1996) [hereinafter Riskin,
Understanding]; the "New Old Grid," which appeared in Riskin, Who Decides What?,
supra, at 22, and in Riskin, Retiring and Replacing, supra, at 69, is presented again in
this Article in part II.A. The "New Grid System" appeared in Riskin, Who Decides
What?, supra, at 22, and in Riskin, Retiring and Replacing, supra, at 69. The "New New
Grid System," which replaces the "New Grid System," appears for the first time in this
Article in Part II.B. For a fuller explanation, see infra notes 131 and 138.
4 See Riskin, Mediator Orientations, supra note 3; Riskin, Understanding, supra note
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FiGuRE 1. THE "OLD GRID": MEDIATOR ORIENTATIONS
Role of Mediator
EVALUATIVE
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Definition
NARROW
Problem
Definition
BROAD
FACILITATIVE
Role of Mediator
mediation, yet there was no widely accepted system for describing or
identifying the variants. So I meant to supply a vocabulary and set of
concepts for distinguishing among disparate processes that were com-
monly labeled mediation. I also thought that the grid would help par-
ties in conflict and their lawyers decide whether to mediate, how to
select a mediator, and how to prepare for and participate in media-
tion. And I believed it could help mediators understand their work
better; help program administrators make choices about selecting,
training, and assigning mediators; and help professional and govern-
ment organizations regulate mediation practice.
The grid has found employment for all these purposes. It has
stimulated or framed many of the discussions and debates about the
nature of mediation and how to define and regulate it.5 It has ap-
5 See, e.g., JamesJ. Alfini et a]., Evaluative Versus Facilitative Mediation: A Discussion,
24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 919 (1997); Richard Birke, Evaluation and Facilitation: Moving
Past Either/Or, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 309; Gary L. Gill-Austern, Faithful, 2000 J. Disp.
RESOL. 343; Dwight Golann, Variations in Mediation: How-and Why-Legal Mediators
Change Styles in the Course of a Case, 2000J. Disp. RESOL. 41; Chris Guthrie, The Lawyer's
Philosophical Map and the Disputant's Perceptual Map: Impediments to Facilitative Mediation
and Lawyering, 6 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 145 (2001); John Lande, Toward More Sophisti-
cated Mediation Theory, 2000J. Disp. RESOL. 321; Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why
Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 937 (1997); Lela P. Love &
Kimberlee K. Kovach, ADR.' An Eclectic Array of Processes, Rather than One Eclectic Process,
2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 295; L. Randolph Lowry, To Evaluate or Not: That is Not the Ques-
tion!, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 48 (2000);James H. Stark, The Ethics of Media-
EVALUATIVE EVALUATIVE
NARROW BROAD
FACILITATIVE FACILITATIVE
NARROW BROAD
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peared in many books6 and articles 7 on mediation and dispute resolu-
tion Evaluation: Some Troublesome Questions and Tentative Proposals, From an Evaluative
Lawyer Mediator, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 769 (1997); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Beyond Formalism
and False Dichotomies: The Need for Institutionalizing a Flexible Concept of the Mediator's Role,
24 FLA. ST. U. L. RE,. 949 (1997) [hereinafter Stempel, Beyond False Dichotomies]; Jef-
frey W. Stempel, Identifying Real Dichotomies Underlying the False Dichotomy: Twenty-First
Century Mediation in an Eclectic Regime, 2001 J. DisP. RESOL. 371 [hereinafter Stempel,
Real Dichotomies]; Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Inevitability of the Eclectic: Liberating ADR from
Ideology, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL. 247 [hereinafter Stempel, Inevitability]; Joseph B.
Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediator Orientations: Piercing the "Grid" Lock, 24
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 985 (1997); Donald T. Weckstein, In Praise of Party Empowerment-
And ofMediatorActivism, 33 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 501 (1997); Zena Zumeta, A Facilita-
tive Mediator Responds, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 335.
The other most commonly used categorization is "transformative" and "problem-
solving," which was presented by Professors Robert A. Baruch Bush and Joseph P.
Folger. ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994). Bar-
bara Ashley Phillips has identified the "problem-solving-transformative" approach to
mediation. BARBARA ASHLEY PHILLIPS, THE MEDIATION FIELD GUIDE: TRANSCENDING
LITIGATION AND RESOLVING CONFLICTS IN YOUR BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION 59 (2001);
see alsoJOHN WINSLADE & GERALD MONK, NARRATIVE MEDIATION: A NEW APPROACH TO
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 31-41 (2000) (describing many of the assumptions inherent in
the problem-solving approaches to mediation and offering a critique). Other com-
mentators have developed systems of categorizing mediation. See Riskin, Understand-
ing, supra note 3, at 14-16 (describing several systems of categorization); Ellen A.
Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A Multiple Model Approach, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 703, 707-10 (1997) (classifying mediations in terms of "norm-generat-
ing," "norm-educating," and "norm-advocating" models).
6 Riskin, Understanding, supra note 3, has been reprinted in whole or in part in
JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 171 (2001); RUSSELL
KOROBrKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 357-65 (2002); MEDIATION: THEORY,
POLICY AND PRACTICE 152, 155, 165, 180-01 (Carrie Menkel-Meadow ed., 2001); LEO-
NARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 314-28,
427-33 (1997). It has been translated into Portuguese and published as Leonard L.
Riskin, Compreendendo as Orientafdes, Estratdgias e Thcnicas do Mediador: Um Padrdo para
Iniciantes, in ESTUDOS EM ARBITRAGEM, MEDIAGAO E NEGOCIACAO (Andr6 Gomma de
Azevedo ed., 2001).
Riskin, Understanding, supra note 3, also won the first prize for best article on
dispute resolution published in 1996, from the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution
Excellence and Innovation in ADR Awards.
The earlier article, Riskin, Mediator Orientations, supra note 3, has been reprinted
in whole or in part in DISPUTE RESOLUTION: READINGS AND CASE STUDIES 301 (Julie
Macfarlane ed., 2d ed. 2003); CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., APPROPRIATE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION (forthcoming 2004); MELISSA NELKEN, UNDERSTANDING NEGOTIATION 438
(2001); PORTLAND FED. EXEC. BD., ADR/SHARED NEUTRALS PROGRAM HANDBOOK app.
1 (1997); ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF
LAWYERS 415 (3d ed. 2002). It has been translated into Czech and published in
MEDIACE ANEB JAK RESIT KONFLIKTY 50 (Otmara Hrugkovd et al., trans., 1996)
7 See sources cited supra note 5.
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tion and in hundreds of mediation training programs" and law school
and university courses.9 It has been used to help regulate the practice
of mediation, 10 to help parties select mediators," to help mediators
understand their own approaches 12 and to help organizations under-
stand the mediation programs with which they are involved.' 3 The
terms "facilitative" and "evaluative" have become part of the language
in the field.
The grid has attracted a lot of criticism, too. 14 The most passion-
ate-and long-lived-criticism rested on the notion that evaluation
was not properly part of the mediator's role and that I had done
8 For example, the grid is a standard feature of the numerous training programs
sponsored in recent years by the Michigan Institute for Continuing Legal Education.
Interview with Shel Stark, Education Director, Michigan Institute for Continuing Le-
gal Education, in Ann Arbor, Mich. (Jan. 20, 2003).
9 I have not kept track, but I estimate that I have received and granted well over
100 requests to reprint these articles for training programs or for law school and
other university courses-often for multiple uses. I also am aware that many trainers
use these articles without permission.
10 For example, Michigan rules on court-ordered domestic relations mediation
provide: "If the parties have not stipulated to a mediator, the parties must indicate
whether they prefer a mediator who is willing conduct [sic] evaluative mediation. Fail-
ure to indicate a preference will be treated as not requesting evaluative mediation."
MICH. CT. R. 3.216(E) (3) (emphasis added).
11 This assertion is based on numerous casual comments from program adminis-
trators and my own experience in being invited to mediate or considered for a
mediation.
12 See Jeffrey Krivis & Barbara McAdoo, A Style Index for Mediators, 15 ALTERNA-
TIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 157, 164 (1997). Along with many other people, I find this
instrument useful in giving mediators insight into their own practices or tendencies
with respect to facilitation. I worry, however, about using it to impose a label on a
mediator.
13 See E. PATRICK McDERMOTT ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION MEDIATION PROGRAM (2000), available at http://
www.eeoc.gov/mediate/report/index.html [hereinafter MCDERMOTT, EVALUATION];
E. PATRICK MCDERMOTT ET AL., THE EEOC MEDIATION PROGRAM: MEDIATORS'
PERSPECTIVE ON THE PARTIES, PROCESSES, AND OUTCOMES (2001), available at http://
www.eeoc.gov/mediate/mcdfinal.html [hereinafter McDERMOTT, MEDIATORS]; E.
Patrick McDermott & Ruth Obar, "What's Going On" in Mediation: An Empirical Analysis
of Party Satisfaction with Mediator Style, the Factors that Yield the Highest Charging Party
Monetary Return, and What Really Happens in the Mediation of Charges Before the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commision, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
14 See, e.g., Love, supra note 5, at 937; Love & Kovach, supra note 5, at 297;
Kimberlee Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin's Grid, 3
HARV. NEGOT. L. REx'. 71, 72-73 (1998); Stulberg, supra note 5, at 985.
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something of a disservice by including it on the map. 15 I anticipated
that criticism and addressed it in the 1996 article; I said that I was
simply trying to describe processes that were commonly called media-
tion, 16 and further, that it was "too late" to say that evaluation was not
part of mediation because thousands of people who were known as
"mediators" were "evaluating."'17 As further criticisms, concerns, and
alternative approaches appeared, I reacted defensively and responded
in writing only once, trying to deflect the criticism with humor.18 I
believed that the grid in fact helped people make sense out of a cha-
otic reality and that it could serve to describe the "approach" or "ori-
entation" of virtually any mediator. Many friends and colleagues
encouraged me in such beliefs, which hardened into self-satisfied
complacency.
15 Professors Kovach and Love have provided the most consistent criticism. Here
is a convenient summary of their principal points, which Professor Love has styled
"The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate":
I. The roles and related tasks of evaluators and facilitators are at odds.
II. Evaluation promotes positioning and polarization, which are antitheti-
cal to the goals of mediation.
III. Ethical codes caution mediators-and other neutrals-against assum-
ing additional roles.
W. If mediators evaluate legal claims and defenses, they must be lawyers;
eliminating non-lawyers will weaken the field.
V. There are insufficient protections against incorrect mediator
evaluations.
VI. Evaluation abounds: The disputing world needs alternative paradigms.
VII. Mediator evaluation detracts from the focus on party responsibility for
critical evaluation, re-evaluation, and creative problem-solving.
VIII. Evaluation can stop negotiation.
IX. A uniform understanding of mediation is critical to the development
of the field.
X. Mixed processes can be useful, but call them what they are!
Love, supra note 5, at 948; Love & Kovach, supra note 5, at 303; see also Kovach &
Love, supra note 14, at 73; Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, "Evaluative"Mediation
is an Oxymoron, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COSTS LITIG. 31, 31 (1996); Stulberg, supra
note 5, at 1004-05 (1997). For a summary of criticisms related to the notion that a
mediator may evaluate, see Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in
Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization ? 6 HAR'. NEGOT. L.
REV. 1, 27-32 (2001).
I do not intend to directly address the propriety of mediator evaluation in this
Article. Instead, I hope to facilitate decisionmaking about whether, when, and how
the mediator should evaluate. See infra notes 137-41.
16 See Riskin, Understanding, supra note 3, at 13.
17 Id.
18 See Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation Quandaries, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1007 (1997).
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This state of mind was firmly in place when Professor Jennifer
Brown called to invite me to revisit the grid for a presentation at Yale
Law School. Fifteen minutes later, it began to dissolve. Although I
remain pleased with the considerable extent to which the grid has
fostered understanding and dialogue, much of which has been help-
ful to the field, I am troubled by several aspects of the grid and the
way in which people have used it. I wish I could say that, had I known
the grid would have been so influential, I would have done a better
job of constructing it. But the truth is that I did the best I could.
Two developments that have followed the appearance of the grid
seem to require a better understanding of mediation. First, it has be-
come clear that the "facilitative-evaluative" debate and other issues
raised by the grid have significant real-world implications. They affect
mediation training, 19 regulation and practice, 20 evaluation,2 1 as well as
who mediates,22 how mediation is presented to the public, and
mediators' self-identities. 23 Second, many participants in the field-
mediators, lawyers, parties, program administrators, and regulators-
have become much more sophisticated about mediation, so the old
grid may serve their purposes less well.
And so, in the spirit of fostering more refined understanding and
dialogue about mediation, in the following pages I describe weak-
nesses and limitations in the grid and problems they have fostered,
and I proffer ways to address most of these problems. Part I sets out
the background, purposes and nature of the grid system and identifies
a series of problems and limitations associated with it. Part II first
proffers a revised version of the grid of mediator orientations (the
"New Old Grid"). It then proposes to replace the "Old Grid" and the
"New Old Grid"-both of which are static and limited in other ways-
with a "New New Grid" System.
19 See Interview with Shel Stark, supra note 8.
20 See Welsh, supra note 15, at 34-57.
21 See McDERMOTr, EVALUATION, supra note 13; McDERMOTT, MEDIATORS, supra
note 13.
22 Lela Love, for instance, claims that "[i]f mediators evaluate legal claims and
defenses, they must be lawyers; eliminating non-lawyers will weaken the field." Love,
supra note 5, at 941.
23 John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each Other?,
24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839, 891 (1997).
[VOL. 79:1
DECISIONMAKING IN MEDIATION
I. REVISITING THE GRID: THE "OLD GRID" AND ITS USES
AND PROBLEMS
A. Reviewing the "Old Grid": Its Background, Nature, and Uses
I developed the grid system in response to a request from a large
law firm to present a training program for its lawyers and clients on
how to participate in mediation. 24 In planning that program, I real-
ized that I could not advise anyone about taking part in mediation
without knowing the nature of the process that would actually take
place. Yet a diverse array of processes were called mediation, and
there was no widely accepted method for describing these variations.
Partly as a result of this situation, potential users of mediation often
had no reliable way to know or learn what would take place in media-
tion. The problem was compounded by three disparities between
"theory" and "practice," i.e., between conventional explanations of
mediation and certain common mediator beliefs and behaviors. 25 The
first disparity had to do with evaluation: the conventional wisdom of
mediation trainers and authorities held that mediators did not predict
court outcomes or tell parties how to resolve their disputes; in fact,
however, many did so. 26 The second disparity concerned the issues to
be mediated or the goals of the mediation. Most experts on media-
tion asserted that mediation was meant to deal with what was really at
stake for the parties, i.e., their needs or interests, and to empower
them to develop their own resolutions. 27 In fact, many mediations-
especially those involving "legal disputes"-i.e., disputes that the par-
ties were planning (or hoping or threatening) to litigate-did not en-
compass such issues; instead, they focused primarily on legal or other
24 See Riskin, Understanding, supra note 3, at 8.
25 For recent efforts to address gaps between theory and practice in dispute reso-
lution, see Christopher Honeyman et al., Here There Be Monsters: at the Edge of the Map of
Conflict Resolution, in THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION PRACTITIONER I (Shinji Morokuma
ed., 2001).
26 See Lande, supra note 5, at 328 ("Until recently, the facilitative perspective has
been the stated orthodoxy of the mediation field generally, not simply one faction.");
infra notes 31-40 and accompanying text. I am describing an understanding that was
common among people involved in "the modern mediation movement," i.e., those
concerned with mediation in community and family disputes and in civil lawsuits.
Labor mediators in some sectors commonly accepted more evaluative behavior. See,
e.g., DEBORAH M. KOLB, THE MEDIATORS 18-19 (1983).
27 See JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 7-8 (1984); Kovach & Love, supra note
15, at 31; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of
Innovation Co-Opted or "The Law of ADR, "19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 6-9 (1991); Leonard
L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 34 (1982).
2003 ]
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positional claims and attempted to reach resolutions "in the shadow
of the law." 28
Partly as a result of these disparities between theory and practice,
most parties and lawyers, and even some mediators, did not recognize
the existence of choices about the goals and characteristics of the me-
diation process; nor did they recognize the existence of issues about
how, when, and by whom these choices should be made. This ac-
counts for the third disparity between theory and practice: although
virtually all proponents and exponents of mediation put party self-de-
termination at its core,29 in practice, parties frequently did not have
the opportunity or knowledge necessary to exercise self-
determination.3 0
By developing the grid, I meant to bring these issues to the atten-
tion of not only the lawyers and clients I was to train, but also
mediators, program administrators, regulators and other potential
participants. The method rested on two closely related questions,
both of which focused on the mediator "1. Does the mediator tend to
define problems narrowly or broadly? 2. Does the mediator ... evalu-
ate-make assessments or predictions or proposals for agreements-
or facilitate the parties' negotiations without evaluating?" '
B. Reconsidering the "Old Grid": Its Problems and Limitations
Although many have found the grid helpful, it contains or has
acquired a bundle of limitations, which became apparent to me only
recently. This Part describes problems associated with each contin-
uum and three other major deficiencies of the "Old Grid": its failure
to distinguish different kinds of decisions in and about mediation; its
limited focus and static quality; and the fundamental idea that the
grid can depict overall mediator orientations.
28 1 borrow the phrase from Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining
in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE LJ. 950, 997 (1979). Although I
did not say so explicitly, such cases informed my thinking in developing the grid. (I
am grateful to Arnold Zack for bringing this to my attention. E-mail from Arnold
Zack, Mediator and Arbitrator, to Leonard L. Riskin, Professor, University of Missouri-
Columbia School of Law (June 12, 2001) (on file with author).) I did, however, be-
lieve that the grid could help describe a mediator's orientation toward any kind of
dispute.
29 See Welsh, supra note 15 passim.
30 Id. The involvement of lawyers and the stereotypical lawyer's perspective,
which I have called the "lawyer's standard philosophical map," sometimes contributed
to this situation. See Riskin, supra note 27, at 43.
31 Riskin, Mediator Orientations, supra note 3, at 111.
[VOL. 79:1l
DECISIONMAKING IN MEDIATION
1. The Facilitative-Evaluative/Role-of-the-Mediator Continuum
a. Description
When I developed the system, most mediation trainers and com-
mentators held that mediators did not, or ought not, predict what
would happen in court or tell parties what to do.3 2 In practice, how-
ever, many mediators did give evaluations and some pushed parties
toward settlement or a particular settlement.33 On top of that, many
parties or their lawyers seemed to want either or both of these ser-
vices-or thought they were standard features of mediation.3 4 Yet the
subject of whether, when, and how a mediator should evaluate re-
ceived almost no attention in writings or training programs. 35 Many
32 See supra note 26.
33 See Kovach & Love, supra note 15, at 31; Bobbi McAdoo & Art Hinshaw, The
Challenge of Institutionalizing Alternative Dispute Resolution: Attorney Perspectives on the Ef-
fect of Rule 17 on Civil Litigation in Missouri, 67 Mo. L. REV. 473, 523 (2002); Barbara
McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, Does ADR Really Have a Place on the Lawyer's Philosophical
Map?, 18 HAMLINEJ. PUB. L. & POL'Y 376, 390 (1997); Welsh, supra note 15, at 30-31.
34 See Bobbi McAdoo, A Report to the Minnesota Supreme Court: The Impact of Rule
114 on Civil Litigation Practice in Minnesota, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 401, 472 (1997), (deal-
ing with a later time period but probably reflecting long-standing attitudes); McAdoo
& Welsh, supra note 33, at 390.
One possible explanation of this disparity between theory and practice is this:
much of the writing on mediation in the late 1970s and early 1980s dealt with media-
tions that'lawyers did not typically attend, such as community mediation and divorce
mediation, and in which, accordingly, there was much concern about protecting the
autonomy or self-determination of the parties. For examples, see Welsh, supra note
15, at 15-21; Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice
Got to Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 813-14 (2001), and some of these writings
drew on anti-law or anti-lawyer sentiments, suggesting that information about law
often was not important in a mediation. See Welsh, supra note 15, at 15-18. Some
commentators understood these writings to suggest that mediation had an essentially
a-legal character and, accordingly, posed a danger to less powerful parties, which
might be remedied by an infusion of law. See, e.g.,JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITH-
OUT LAW? 117-19 (1983). In disputes that could plausibly wind up in court, however,
the idea that mediation had an a-legal or non-legal character made little sense. Yet
this conventional wisdom continued to have force in the literature, which often failed
to distinguish between "legal" disputes and others.
35 See Kovach & Love, supra note 15, at 31. There may be a few exceptions to this
generalization, but I am aware of only one-the approach to mediation developed by
Gary Friedman and Jack Himmelstein, which focuses much attention on the relation-
ship between law and mediation. In this approach, the mediator offers to predict how
a court would deal with the case, but makes clear that the parties are tinder no obliga-
tion to do what a court would do. In other words, the mediator is to use law to free
the parties from feeling constrained by the law's shadow. See GARY J. FRIEDMAN, A
GUIDE TO DIVORCE MEDIATION: HOW TO REACH A FAIR, LEGAL SETTLEMENT AT A FRAC-
TION OF THE COST passim (1993); THE CENTER FOR MEDIATION IN LAW, TRAINING
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commentators and trainers confused the "is" and the "ought," treating
the fact that many mediators evaluated like a dirty secret.
This situation produced several consequences that disturbed me.
First, parties sometimes entered mediation expecting no evaluation,
but getting one nonetheless-without asking for it, consenting to it,
or preparing for it.36 Second, the reverse sometimes happened: par-
ties who expected or wanted an evaluation learned, once they got into
a mediation, that the mediator would not or could not provide one. 37
And third, some mediators gave evaluations that, because of their na-
ture or timing, impeded progress toward resolving the dispute or un-
dermined other values associated with mediation. 38 It appeared to me
that significant numbers of mediators maintained fixed attitudes and
practices about whether-and how and when-they would evaluate,
but there was no accepted system or practice for conveying such infor-
mation to the parties or their lawyers.
In order to highlight these problems and the opportunities asso-
ciated with them, in describing the role of the mediator, I chose to
emphasize just one aspect of a mediator's behavior: the extent to
which, in helping parties settle their dispute, the mediator tended to
"evaluate," e.g., by assessing the strengths and weaknesses of a legal
position or predicting outcomes in court.3 9 I contrasted "evaluate"
MATERIALS 18-20 (2003) (similar discussions appeared in earlier versions of these
materials); see also Videotape: Saving the Last Dance: Resolving Conflict Through Un-
derstanding (Harvard Law School Program on Negotiation & The Center for Media-
tion in Law 2001) [hereinafter Saving the Last Dance].
Recently trainers and commentators have paid attention to the when, where,
how, and why of evaluation. See, e.g., Marjorie Corman Aaron, Evaluation in Mediation,
in MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES: EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR LAWYERS AND MEDIATORS
§§ 10.0-10.9, at 267-305 (Dwight Golann ed. 1996). Hamline University Law School
recently offered a summer school course called "Evaluative Mediation." See HAMLINE
UNIV. SCH. OF LAW DISPUTE RESOLUTION INST., SUMMER 2003 COURSE OFFERINGS, avail-
able at http://web.hamline.edu/law/adr/2summer.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2003).
36 See, e.g., Kovach & Love, supra note 15, at 31; Welsh, supra note 15, at 9-15
(analyzing Allen v. Leal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 945 (S.D. Tex. 1998), and describing several
other cases). Marjorie Corman Aaron has pointed out a more subtle disjunction be-
tween theory and practice. She observed "mediators who seem to have formed a view
about case value-an evaluation-and who thus directed their 'reality testing' ques-
tions to pressure a party to 'seeing' that evaluation." Memorandum from Marjorie
Aaron, Executive Director, Center for Practice in Negotiation and Problem-Solving
Lawyering, University of Cincinnati College of Law, to Leonard L. Riskin, Professor,
University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law (Aug. 9, 2002) (on file with author).
37 This was a common occurrence. It appears to be what happened in the first
mediation described by Barry Werth in BARRY WERTH, DAMAGES: ONE FAMILY'S STRUG-
GLES IN THE WORLD OF MEDICINE 310-25 (1998).
38 See Welsh, supra note 15, at 27-32; see also Welsh, supra note 34, at 813-14.
39 See Riskin, Understanding, supra note 3, at 23-24.
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with "facijitate," by which I meant that the mediator assisted the par-
ties' negotiations without evaluating. 40 And I put "evaluative" and
"facilitative" at opposite ends of a continuum depicting the mediator's
role (or the mediator's concept of the mediator's role). And I said
that each of these terms also represented a continuum. Thus, evalua-
tion could range from behavior that is principally informative (e.g.,
"Your case is weak on x.") to directive (e.g., 'You should pay $y."),
which I considered an extreme form of evaluation.41 And facilitation
could range from, say, asking parties how likely it was that their case
could get to the jury, to simply keeping order while parties discuss
whatever they wish, as they wish.
b. Problems
Both the continuum structure and the facilitative-evaluative ter-
minology have caused problems.
i. The Continuum Structure Has Caused Confusion
Some commentators have dealt with facilitation and evaluation as
if they were alternatives, treating the continuum-on which I said
many mediators move around42-like a dichotomy.43 And many com-
mentators employed these concepts as if they were real and repre-
40 See id. at 24. The choice of these labels also derived in part from my commit-
ment to the idea that mediation should rest on and enhance self-determination or
autonomy of the parties and should deal with the real interests, not just the positions
or legal claims, see Riskin, supra note 27, at 57, and from the assumption that evalua-
tion tends to interfere with the development of both of these. As indicated below, I
now find that assumption confusingly simplistic. See infra text accompanying notes
63-76.
41 As indicated below, I made a mistake by including directive behavior in the
evaluative continuum. Instead, I should have distinguished between evaluation and
direction. See infra text accompanying notes 66-74.
42 See Riskin, Understanding, supra note 3, at 36.
43 See, e.g., Kovach & Love, supra note 14, at 75; Love & Kovach, supra note 5, at
306; see also Birke, supra note 5, at 310, 318 (arguing that mediation is both evaluative
and facilitative); Stempel, Inevitability, supra note 5, at 269-85, (viewing the contin-
uum as a false dichotomy). Some statements in my writings about the grid doubtless
encouraged such dichotomous thinking. For example, I categorized mediators by
quadrants, referring to "the evaluative-narrow mediator." Riskin, Understanding, supra
note 3, at 26. Krivis and McAdoo, in creating a self-administered instrument based on
the grid, did not actually treat the continuums as if they were dichotomies, but their
classification system may have subtly, and inadvertently, encouraged such dichoto-
mous thinking. Krivis & McAdoo, supra note 12, at 165
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sented actual orientations toward practice, 44 and they routinely
distinguished between "facilitative mediation" and "evaluative media-
tion."45 Much in my 1994 and 1996 writings encouraged this. 4 6
It is quite clear, however, that many-probably most-mediators
engage in behaviors that fit into both categories. They evaluate and
facilitate, a fact that I mentioned in the 1994 and 1996 writings. 47 As
Professor Dwight Golann recently demonstrated, mediators often eval-
uate on some issues and facilitate on others, all within the same time
block, and they typically decide on their moves at least partially in
response to the personalities and conduct of the other participants. 48
44 Such limited, dualistic, and formalistic readings of the facilitative-evaluative
role of the mediator dimension of the grid may have contributed to what some com-
mentators have called a "polarization" in the literature. See Birke, supra note 5, at
309 (referring to Kovach & Love, supra note 15, at 31; Love, supra note 5; and
Jonathan B. Marks, "Evaluative Mediation"--Oxymoron or Essential Tool?, Am. LAW., May
1996, at 48A); Stempel, Inevitability, supra note 5, at 269-85.
I am sure that my writings contributed to this reification and dualistic thinking.
For instance, I said that the orientations were not ideal types, but corresponded to
actual practices of a substantial portion of mediators, even though many mediators
drew from each quadrant. Riskin, Understanding, supra note 3, at 26 n.60.
45 See, e.g., supra note 35.
46 For instance, I sometimes referred to the "evaluative broad mediator." Riskin,
Understanding, supra note 3, at 29-30. I asserted that most mediators operated from a
predominant or default orientation. Id. at 24. And this dichotomous language about
orientations took hold despite my assertions about the difficulties of categorizing
mediators' orientations, strategies, and techniques. Id. at 36.
47 Riskin, Understanding, supra note 3, at 36; see also Golann, supra note 5, at 61
(documenting that mediators change approaches during a mediation session in re-
sponse to circumstances); Krivis & McAdoo, supra note 12, at 165 (stating that a medi-
ator may "move around the grid by using different strategies and techniques
depending on the circumstances"); Stempel, Beyond False Dichotomies, supra note 5, at
952 ("Good mediators should be both facilitative and evaluative in varying degrees.");
Stempel, Inevitability, supra note 5, at 250 (defining an "eclectic" approach to media-
tion that dissolves the strict dichotomy between evaluation and facilitation).
Unfortunately, the grid, because it purports to describe overall, predominant, or
default "orientations," does not provide a good way to describe such mediators.
Other commentators also have noted this. See, e.g., Stulberg, supra note 5, at 991-92;
Weckstein, supra note 5, at 526.
48 See Golann, supra note 5, at 61. The facilitative-evaluative continuum deals
with the role of the mediator, and not the nature of the process. Thus, it refers to evalua-
tions provided by the mediator and was not meant to include evaluations that were
produced by the parties in a mediation. Mediator evaluation, for instance, does not
describe processes in which the mediator encourages the lawyers to present their le-
gal arguments or ask questions to elicit the lawyer's or client's views on the strengths
or weaknesses of their cases. Although such procedures produce "evaluations," the
mediator does not give her own evaluations; accordingly, such procedures do not raise
the concerns often associated with evaluation by the mediator: for instance, that it is
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There are other problems in my system of categorizing a media-
tor's approach toward her role. First, a mediator may both evaluate
and facilitate on the same issue. For instance, a mediator might make
a particular prediction or proposal and then facilitate discussion
around it;4 9 conversely, she might facilitate a discussion around a cer-
tain issue and then make a prediction or recommendation. In addi-
tion, a particular move can have both evaluative and facilitative
aspects or objectives or effects. A prediction about what would hap-
pen in court, for example-given in the right manner, at the right
time, in the right context-can help enable (or empower) the parties
to negotiate in light of that information, and not merely in its
shadow.50 Thus, a mediator can predict what would happen in court
and tell parties that they need not be limited by that; in fact, she may
encourage them to use that information simply as a way to understand
their court alternative, and then, using facilitation, help them develop
options that improve upon it.51 Such a mediator is providing the eval-
uation in order to set the stage for facilitation. 52 Next, the mediator
might use either facilitative or evaluative moves, or both, to help the
parties select one of the options. In other words, moves that I classi-
fied as evaluative and facilitative often travel in tandem. To make
things more confusing, facilitation by the mediator can produce an
not an appropriate part of the mediator's role, that it might interfere with party self-
determination, that it might mean that the mediator is practicing law.
The production of an evaluation through a decision-tree analysis is more difficult
to characterize. The mediator develops an understanding (or understandings) of the
"value" of a legal claim based on the predictions of the parties or their lawyers as to
the likelihood of various contingencies (e.g., getting to ajury or getting a verdict of a
certain amount) coming to pass. See Marjorie Corman Aaron & David P. Hoffer, Deci-
sion Analysis as a Method of Evaluating the Trial Alternative, in MEDIATING LEGAL DIS-
PuTEs: EFFECTIvE STRATEGIES FOR LAW-YERS AND MEDIATORS, supra note 35, §11, at 307.
Professor Dwight Golann recently described mediators' evaluation of the bargain-
ing process, exemplified by a mediator's predictions to one side about the other side's
likely reaction to a particular proposal. Golann, supra note 5, at 50. In preparing the
grid, I did not envision a place for such behavior, which I consider negotiation coach-
ing. But the "New Old Grid" and the "New New Grid" System provide ways to charac-
terize and depict this behavior. See infra Parts II.A, II.B.2.b-c.
49 See Riskin, Understanding, supra note 3, at 37 (describing the work of Frances
Butler).
50 See id. at 36-38.
51 See id. at 37 (describing the work of Gary Friedman).
52 Many commentators have recognized this relationship between evaluation and
facilitation. Professor Jeffrey Stempel, for instance, posits a "broad notion of facilita-
tion that encompasses use of evaluative techniques in appropriate circumstances."
Stempel, Beyond False Dichotomies, supra note 5, at 961; see also Birke, supra note 5, at
317 ("[An evaluative mediator evaluates only part of the time. Facilitation creates
the agreement if one is reached."); Welsh, supra note 15, at 32 n.137.
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evaluation through the use of evaluative statements made by the law-
yers or parties. 53
In addition, it frequently may be difficult to characterize a partic-
ular intervention without knowing its actual impact, which may not
accord with the mediator's intention.54 For instance, I have suggested
that generally a question (e.g., about what is likely to happen in court
or what effect a failure to settle may have on business or personal in-
terests) is facilitative, 5 5 whereas a statement about such matters is evalu-
ative.56 But a question can have an evaluative impact. This can
happen, of course, when a mediator phrases and delivers the question
in such a way as to make it evaluative-for example, "How in the world
do you expect to be able to prove that?" But it can also happen when
the mediator asks the question out of genuine curiosity or to help the
party think it through, but the party or lawyer interprets the question as
an evaluation.5 7 Similarly, a mediator can present a statement in a
soft way, without any pressure or intent to incline the parties toward
using that evaluation to frame their agreement-which makes it essen-
tially facilitative. 5 8 And of course, body language-deliberate or
not-can have facilitative or evaluative effects.
Labeling a mediator's orientation as either facilitative or evaluative
faces another challenge. Even assuming we can reliably label particu-
lar moves or strategies as either facilitative or evaluative, if the media-
tor engages in both kinds of activities, how can we determine the
correct label? If a mediator spends 98% of her time in non-evaluative
activities, for instance, but gives an evaluation as a last resort, how
53 This is a common practice in what I have called facilitative-narrow mediation,
but, to my mind, it does not constitute evaluation by the mediator. A closer case is
presented by the use of decision-tree analysis, through which the mediator produces
an evaluation that is based on predictions of the parties and lawyers, which the media-
tor inserts into a "decision tree." See supra note 48. Rosselle Wissler has made the
helpful distinction between mediators who evaluate the case and those who assist the
parties in evaluating the case. Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General
Civil Cases: What We Know from Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 641,
656 (2002).
54 See Riskin, Understanding, supra note 3, at 36-37.
55 See id. at 28.
56 See id. at 27, 31.
57 Roselle Wissler has found that mediation participants are much more likely
than mediators to perceive the mediator's interventions as evaluative. ROSELLE L.
WISSLER, TRAPPING THE DATA: AN ASSESSMENT OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS MEDIATION IN
MAINE AND OHIO COURTS 15, 69 (1999).
58 Since I developed the grid, I have become more aware of my own intentions in
mediation. I have noticed, for instance, that sometimes I will ask a question in order
to gently encourage or prompt a party toward a particular view or decision.
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would we label her orientation?59 And how can the grid account for
the "centrality" of the evaluative activity?60 In addition, categorizing a
mediator's approach to the mediator's role as either facilitative or
evaluative does not give appropriate recognition to either the time
dimension or the interactive and dynamic process through which
most thoughtful mediators tend to decide what to do in a mediation.
In other words, it assumes a high level of rigidity in the mediator's
conduct that is not always present and, when it is, may result in missed
opportunities. (These complications may explain why, in a recent
Wisconsin Bar Journal poll, the same person was voted the best facilita-
tive mediator and the second-best evaluative mediator.61 )
In other words, to say that mediator X is "facilitative" is compara-
ble to saying that my cousin Joe is "generous." Both adjectives have a
modicum of predictive value. But knowing that Joe has a "generous"
nature does not tell us whether he will contribute to Save the Whales;
much depends on the manner, nature, and timing of solicitation, on
Joe's mood, and the state of his portfolio. Likewise, knowing that me-
diator X has an "evaluative" approach does not tell us whether that
mediator will evaluate or facilitate as to a particular issue in particular
circumstances.
For all these reasons, it seems clear that labeling a mediator's ap-
proach to the role of mediator as either facilitative or evaluative-
which offers convenience and perhaps a comforting belief that we un-
derstand what's going on-may obscure what's really going on. 62
ii. The Facilitative-Evaluative Terminology Has Caused
Confusion
The kinds of interpretive problems described above would afflict
virtually any method of dividing behavior into categories. But the
terms evaluative and facilitative present special problems, because-
and I realized this only recently- evaluating and facilitating are not oppo-
59 For one useful approach, see Krivis & McAdoo, supra note 12, at 165.
60 David Geronemus and Margaret L. Shaw have pointed out that the grid does
not capture this dimension. David Geronemus & Margaret L. Shaw, Mediation in the
Public and Private Sectors: Similarities and Differences, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA-PROCEEDINGS OF THE 53D ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON
LABOR (forthcoming 2004).
61 Jane Pribek, McDevitt. Master of Mediation, Wis. LJ., Mar. 27, 2002, at 4. The
mediator so honored, Joseph McDevitt, also ranked first in the most directive media-
tor and the best-prepared mediator categories. Id.
62 In the words ofJohn Ashbery: "... For though there are / some / who can live
without / compasses, it dissolves all complexity / if one is perpetually in the know."
John Ashbery, Runway, NEW YORKER, May 21, 2001, at 85.
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sites any more than kicking a football and playing a football game are
opposites. And this partly explains why the evaluative-facilitative ter-
minology has prompted so much confusion and what some see as po-
larization in the literature.6 3
The fundamental problem is this: mediation is facilitated negotia-
tion. Its essence is facilitation. 64 If facilitation is the essence of media-
tion and if evaluation is the opposite of facilitation, evaluation would
seem to rob mediation of its essence. This might be the gist of Kim
Kovach and Lela Love's conclusion-with which I have belatedly
come to sympathize-that "'[e]valuative' mediation is an
oxymoron. 65
However, as best I can reconstruct, I meant the term "evaluate" to
include a certain set of predictive orjudgmental or directive behaviors
by the mediator that tend (or by which the mediator means) to direct
(or influence or incline) the parties toward particular views of their
problems, toward a particular outcome, or toward settlement in gen-
63 The polarization, of course, was made possible by the tendency among many
commentators to treat the facilitative-evaluative continuum like a dichotomy, as de-
scribed above. Richard Birke believes that the "facilitative-evaluative" debate has had
a polarizing effect. Birke, supra note 5, at 309. John Lande believes that the "debate"
has produced a number of benefits. Lande, supra note 5, at 327-32. He argues that it
has "prompted a more refined understanding" of which methods are most appropri-
ate in various situations and promoted self-consciousness about mediation practices.
Id. at 327-30. He believes this increased sophistication may foster a greater willing-
ness to examine mediation theory. Id. at 330-32. I find it ironic that so many practi-
tioners of mediation who are committed to searching for common ground (myself
included) have characterized much of the treatment of this issue in the literature as a
debate rather than a dialogue or discussion. See, e.g., RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra
note 6, at 394-97 (characterizing the treatment of this issue as the "Facilitative-Evalua-
tive Debate").
64 1 believe that this idea is widely shared among mediators. Bernard Mayer ex-
presses it this way: "Mediation is in essence a form of facilitation where the focus is on
helping people to resolve an identified conflict." BERNARD MAYER, THE DYNAMIcs OF
CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A PRACTITONER's GUIDE 226 (2000). ProfessorJohn Lande has
suggested that, in a sense, evaluation by the parties is the essence of mediation, at least
mediation that is directed toward decisionmaking or dispute resolution (as opposed
to mediation directed at improving the parties themselves). Before parties can reach
an agreement, they must evaluate their alternatives. See Lande, supra note 23, at 873.
Another cause of the confusion is that the term "facilitation" is commonly ap-
plied to processes that are similar to mediation, but clearly are not mediation. For
example, it is now common for organizations to hire people to facilitate meetings of
all sorts. See generally ROGER SCHWARZ, THE SKILLED FACILITATOR: PRACTICAL WISDOM
FOR DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE GROUPS (1994).
65 Kovach & Love, supra note 15, at 31.
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eral;66 and I believed that such behaviors often or typically interfere
with party self-determination. In contrast, I meant the term "facili-
tate" to include a variety of actions by the mediator-not involving
such influences-that tend (or that the mediator intends) to help, or
allow, the parties to find their own way and make their own choices
based on their own understandings. So I selected the terms "facilita-
tive" and "evaluative" partly in order to highlight the mediator's im-
pact on party self-determination, a fundamental espoused value of the
"contemporary mediation movement"6 7 that I thought was imperiled
by mediation practices around evaluation that violated party expecta-
tions or desires. 68
But I failed to emphasize that evaluation by the mediator-de-
pending on the exact circumstances and the kind of evaluation
presented-can either foster or impair self-determination, or both fos-
ter and impair it. As mentioned above, often mediators give evalua-
tions without intending to direct the parties toward a particular
solution. In addition, when evaluation by the mediator offers the only
realistic opportunity for a party to understand the likely alternative
outcome-say, in a court or administrative proceeding-it might sup-
port self-determination for that party by fostering informed consent;6 9
but it also might impair self-determination by limiting either party's
imagination or precluding their efforts to address underlying inter-
ests.70 In such situations-which can arise when a mediation partici-
pant does not have ready access to a lawyer (for example, in some
mediations connected with small claims or divorce proceedings) or
has a lawyer who is unfamiliar with the relevant law or litigation prac-
tices-evaluation (in the sense of a prediction about what would hap-
pen in a court or administrative proceeding) also may promote other
66 Other evidence that I intended "evaluation" to include "direction" appears in
my statement that "evaluative-broad mediators... often define the scope of the prob-
lem to be addressed themselves." Riskin, Understanding, supra note 3, at 33. I realize
that I may be engaging in revisionist history here.
67 Welsh, supra note 15, at 15.
68 Party self-determination has many meanings. See Welsh, supra note 15 passim.
Professor Nancy Welsh has argued that the original vision meant empowering the
parties by giving them responsibility for "identifying the issues to be resolved, recog-
nizing the concerns and interests underlying their positions, generating options for
resolution of their dispute, and evaluating the resolution options." Id. at 19. The
"thinning vision," which evolved in many court-connected mediation programs,
merely gives parties the opportunity to consent to the outcome. Id. at 4.
69 See Weckstein, supra note 5, at 530-32.
70 Similarly, a mediator who offers a proposal for solution in response to the par-
ties' request for such a proposal, can be seen as both fostering and impairing party
self-determination.
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values, such as fairness, and social policies associated with the relevant
law.71
And there is a still more fundamental problem. The greatest
threat to self-determination is caused by behavior that I placed at the
extreme north end of the evaluative continuum, behavior "intended
to direct some or all of the outcomes of a mediation. ' 72 I refer to a
mediator who "urges/pushes parties to accept. . . settlement. ' 73 Such
interventions, however, do not rightly belong on the same continuum
as most other evaluations, because, as I maintained above, evaluations
are not necessarily intended to direct an outcome and do not always
have that effect. In retrospect, I should have labeled them "direc-
tive '' 74 and distinguished them from "evaluative" interventions which,
as explained above, can be either directive or non-directive, or both.
If we put "directive" at one end of the role-of-the-mediator con-
tinuum, what would serve at the other end? "Non-directive" springs to
mind immediately; however, it carries a connotation from psychother-
apy that might cause confusion. 75 "Elicitive," which has a history of
use in writing about mediation, seems to fit better.76 It implies that
the mediator draws something from the parties-ideas, issues, alterna-
tives, proposals. In Part II.A., I set forth a "New Old Grid" of mediator
orientations that employs these terms. 7 7
71 SeeJacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Princi-
ple for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 775, 778, 787 (1999).
72 Riskin, Understanding, supra note 3, at 24.
73 Id. at 35.
74 Other commentators have used the term "directive" in describing mediator
activities or approaches or'orientations. In 1997, for example, John Lande used "di-
rective" in the place of "evaluative." See Lande, supra note 23, at 850 n.40. Simon
Roberts used "directive intervention" to describe one of three models of family media-
tion (the others being "minimal intervention" and "therapeutic intervention"). Si-
mon Roberts, Three Models of Family Mediation, in DIVORCE MEDIATION AND THE LEGAL
PROCESS 144, 145 (Robert Dingwall &John Eekelaar eds., 1988).
75 See CARL R. ROGERS, COUNSELING AND PSYCHOTHERAPY: NEWER CONCEPTS IN
PRACTICE 115-28 (1942).
76 Other commentators also have used the term "elicitive" to describe approaches
to mediation. See, e.g., Peter T. Coleman, Intractable Conflict, in HANDBOOK OF CON-
FLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 440 (Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman
eds., 2000) ("Elicitive approaches to conflict intervention, particularly when working
across cultures, tend to be more respectful of disputants, more empowering and sus-
tainable, and generally more effective than prescriptive approaches."). Professor
John Paul Lederach has developed "prescriptive" and "elicitive" ideal types to describe
conflict resolution training designed to produce a mediation model that makes sense
for a given culture. JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, PREPARING FOR PEACE: CONFLICT TRANSFOR-
MATION ACROSS CULTURES 63-100 (1995).
77 See infra Figure 3.
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2. The Narrow-Broad/Problem-Definition Continuum
The narrow-broad/problem-definition continuum has significant
limitations, too. As indicated below, however, I think it is worth
retaining.
a. Description
When I developed the grid, most well-known authorities held that
the great virtue of mediation, its highest use, was to help the parties
address-in addition to their positional claims-what was really at
stake for them.78 This basic idea appeared in various formulations.
Some spoke of the parties' underlying interests, the goals or motiva-
tions that prompted their positions. 79 Others talked about healing or
repairing relationships, reconciliation, or genuine resolution (as op-
posed to just settling). 8° And virtually all mediation training pro-
grams at that time emphasized such approaches. However, a large
proportion, perhaps a majority, of mediations-especially those in-
volving matters that the parties planned to present in court-main-
tained a much narrower focus. 8 1 And, of course, this narrow focus was
just what many lawyers and their clients wanted-or thought they
wanted. 82 But many were unaware that they might have had choices
in defining the subject matter in mediation.
I tried to capture this issue through the idea of "problem-defini-
tion." I had observed that many mediators tended to define the sub-
ject matter of a mediation in a routine or fixed manner. To the
extent that the problem-definition depends on the mediator's mind-
set, mediators who maintain a narrow focus may deprive parties of the
opportunity to explore their underlying interests or the roots and re-
lational aspects of their conflict, and mediators who allow or en-
courage a broad focus may provide this opportunity. 83 I labeled the
78 See Riskin, supra note 27, at 34.
79 SeeJOHN M. HAYNES, DIVORCE MEDIATION 10-11 (1981); F.S.C. Northrop, The
Mediational Approval Theory of Law in American Legal Realism, 44 VA. L. REv. 347, 350-51
(1958).
80 See MARK S. UMBREIT, MEDIATING INTERPERSONAL CONFLICrS: A PATHWAY TO
PEACE passim (1995); Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L.
REV. 305, 308-09 (1971); Riskin, supra note 27, at 34.
81 McAdoo and Hinshaw's recent survey, which asked Missouri lawyers how often
mediators "[e]ncourage addressing issues beyond the legal causes of action, deter-
mined that 2 percent '[a]lways' and 21 percent '[u]sually' did so." McAdoo & Hin-
shaw, supra note 33, at 523.
82 McAdoo and Hinshaw's survey of Missouri lawyers concluded that 87%
thought it important that a mediator "knows how to value a case." Id. at 524.
83 Riskin, Understanding, supra note 3, at 18-23.
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poles of the problem-definition continuum narrow and broad, and il-
lustrated a range of ways in which the problem-or subject matter-of
a mediation could be defined.8 4 In a dispute over reimbursement of
travel expenses under a computer services contract, for instance, the
problem could include litigation issues, business interests, personal/
relational interests, or community interests. In this way, I hoped to high-
light the existence of choices about what I considered the most important
aspects of mediation-its focus and purposes.
FIGURE 2. PROBLEM-DEFINITION CONTINUUM
B
N
A R
RI . II. IT. V .R
R Litigation Business Personal/ Community 0
Issues Interests Professional/ Interests
Relational Interests A
D
b. Problems
Overall, this continuum has drawn much less attention than the
facilitative-evaluative continuum. Some have adopted it without com-
ment, I assume because it made sense to them and appears easy to
use. 85 Others have ignored it.86 I am aware of no written criticisms.
There are, however, several problems with this continuum or the way
in which it has been used. The first results from the structure: The
problem-definition continuum seems to obscure the dynamic relation-
ships between different problem-focuses, the approaches and strate-
gies of the mediator, and the wishes and actions of the parties or their
lawyers. As I presented it, this continuum refers mainly to the media-
84 See infra Figure 3.
85 See, e.g., Lela Porter Love, Mediation of Probate Matters: Leaving a Valuable Legacy,
PEPP. Disp. RESOL. J. 255, 262 (2001); J.H. Wade, Problem Definition, 9 BOND Disp.
RESOL. NEWS, May 2001, at 9.
86 See, e.g., Birke, supra note 5 passim; Stempel, Real Dichotomies, supra note 5
passim; Stempel, Inevitability, supra note 5 passim; Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers, Represen-
tation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and Psycholog to Structure Advocacy in a
Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 269 passim (1999).
[VOL. 79:1
DECISIONMAKING IN MEDIATION
tor's tendency to be open to a broad conceptualization or deep inves-
tigation of the problem, and to assist the parties, if they are willing,
toward a similar openness. In fact, a broad focus usually includes the
narrow. In addition, attention to narrow issues may make it possible
to focus more broadly. It may be essential, for example, to resolve a
narrow issue, such as the amount of compensation, before addressing
a "broader" issue, such as the parties' relationship-or vice versa.
Thus, many mediators who begin with a broad approach will "retreat"
to a narrow one if the parties so desire. Mediators who are open to a
broad focus tend to jump around on this continuum, while mediators
who are not open to such a perspective would tend to stay at the nar-
row end. It is easy for users of the grid to ignore these dynamic rela-
tions because the grid, in seeking to describe orientations or
approaches, does not recognize a time dimension.
i. The Narrow-Broad/Problem-Definition Continuum May
Not be Suitable for Describing Some Mediation Goals and
Approaches
When I developed the grid system, I believed that the narrow-
broad/problem-definition continuum would be useful in describing
the goals or focus of virtually any mediation. But some commentators
and practitioners apparently have disagreed; they may have ignored
the problem-definition continuum-or the grid system-partly be-
cause they thought it did not or could not convey ideas about media-
tion goals or-processes that they wanted to emphasize. For example,
the principal goal of "transformative" mediation, as described by Bush
and Folger, is to improve the parties themselves through "empower-
ment and recognition";87 practitioners of transformative mediation
approach both the process and content in an elicitive fashion.88 I
would, therefore, label this approach facilitative (elicitive, in the new
terminology I recommend below) and broad.8 9 In my way of think-
ing, the goal, or "problem," becomes improving the parties them-
87 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 5, at 3.
88 SeeJoseph P. Folger & Robert A. Baruch Bush, Transformative Mediation and
Third-Party Intervention: Ten Hallmarks of a Transformative Approach to Practice, 13 MED.
Q. 263 passim (1996). But see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways of Mediation: The
Transformation of Traditions, Ideologies, Paradigms, and Practices, 11 NEGOTIATION J. 217,
238 (1995) (arguing that Bush and Folger's approach would have mediators "orches-
trate" the communication).
89 See Riskin, Understanding, supra note 3, at 20, 33. Jeffrey Stempel considers
transformative mediation "a subset of facilitative mediation," although he recognizes
that transformative "purists" would likely disagree. Stempel, Real Dichotomies, supra
note 5, at 384.
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selves. Professors Bush and Folger, however, contrast transformative
mediation with what they call "problem-solving mediation," 90 by which
they mean mediation intended to settle a dispute. 91
And in "narrative mediation," as developed byJohn Winslade and
Gerald Monk, the mediator helps shape the parties' perspective on
the dispute by eliciting their "stories" or senses of "meaning," rather
than emphasizing "facts."92 I also have considered this approach
facilitative and broad. Winslade and Monk, however, like Bush and
Folger, have contrasted narrative mediation with "problem-solving"
approaches. I suspect that they, too, would find "problem-definition"
uncomfortably close to "problem-solving. '93
90 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 5, at 59-75. This has prompted confusion because
that term, in much of the negotiation literature, refers to interest- or needs-based
approaches as opposed to position-based or adversarial approaches. See Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solv-
ing, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984). In the past few years, problem-solving has taken on
a broader meaning in legal education. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Prob-
lem Solver and Third Party Neutral: Creativity and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering, 72 TEMP.
L. REV. 785 (1999).
91 In Lisa Bingham's words, "Practitioners of the transformative model might well
argue that the Riskin grid does not capture what they do, because it is off the scale on
the facilitative end and qualitatively different from practice as described in his arti-
cle." Lisa B. Bingham, Why Suppose? Let's Find Out: A Public Policy Research Program on
Dispute Resolution, 2002 J. Disp. REsOL. 101, 118.
Perhaps John Lande's perspective can resolve this problem. He thinks of "em-
powerment and settlement as goals for mediation whereas facilitation and evaluation
are techniques that mediators use." Lande, supra note 5, at 323.
92 WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 5, at 125-26.
93 Barbara Ashley Phillips calls her approach "problem-solving/transformative."
PHILLIPS, supra note 5, at 73.
The problem-definition continuum also does not address some of the issues iden-
tified by Ellen Waldman in her system of classifying mediations-and setting the me-
diator's role-based on whether the mediation is "norm-generating," "norm-
advocating," or "norm-educating." Waldman, supra note 5 passim.
There may be other important concepts about mediation, or approaches to it,
that the problem-definition also cannot capture adequately-at least to the satisfac-
tion of proponents of those approaches. Take the metaphor of depth, for instance,
which Bernard Mayer has elaborated, MAYER, supra note 64, at 115-16, and which I
assumed the narrow-broad problem-definition continuum would cover. Mayer fo-
cuses on three dimensions of resolution-cognitive, behavior, and emotional-and
maintains that the neutral should help the parties understand and seek to resolve
their conflict at the "appropriate level of depth... deep enough to address the real
concerns that people have that are motivating their engagement in a particular con-
flict, but not so deep as to require them to work through fundamental life issues that
are beyond their practical motivation." Id. at 115. Can the narrow-broad/problem-
definition continuum bring focus to this issue, or would it be better to use "deep-
shallow" interests? In preparing the grid, I considered using "depth" instead of
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These examples suggest why many in the field prefer to use con-
cepts other than the narrow-broad problem-definition continuum to
describe the goals and scope of some mediations.
ii. Some Commentators Have Confused or Conflated This
Continuum with the Role-of-the-Mediator Continuum
Many commentators display no interest in the dimension de-
picted by this continuum.94 Others have confused or conflated this
continuum with aspects of the facilitative-evaluative/role-of-the-media-
tor continuum. I believe that they assume (1) that a facilitative media-
tor approach would produce (or give the parties an opportunity to
produce) a broad problem definition;95 or (2) conversely, that an
evaluative mediator approach would produce a narrow problem defi-
nition.96 In other words, these commentators apparently believe that a
mediator with a facilitative orientation would employ facilitative tech-
niques not only in working toward resolving substantive issues, but
also in setting the problem-definition, and that this would lead to a
broad problem-definition, or at least would allow the parties to select
a broad problem-definition. Similarly, they also seem to have assumed
that "evaluative" mediators would tend to impose a narrow problem-
definition. 97
Such assumptions, however, are wholly unwarranted. An evalua-
tive mediation approach would lead to a narrow problem-definition
only if the mediator's approach to problem-definition is evaluative
and narrow.98 Likewise, a facilitative mediation approach would lead
to (or make possible) a broad problem-definition only if the approach
is facilitative and broad.99
"breadth"; one problem was that the opposite of "deep" was "shallow," which had a
pejorative quality I wanted to avoid.
94 See supra note 86.
95 See, e.g., Birke, supra note 5, at 317 ("It is the hope of the facilitative mediator
that by finding shared and different interests a bargaining range may be created and,
furthermore, that conflicting interests can be overcome."); Stempel, Real Dichotomies,
supra note 5, at 377; Stempel, Inevitability, supra note 5, at 288-89.
96 See, e.g., Stempel, Real Dichotomies, supra note 5, at 377; Stempel, Inevitability,
supra note 5, at 288-89; Zumeta, supra note 5, at 337.
97 See Bingham, supra note 91, at 118; Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It's Not True:
Challenging Mediation Ideology, 2002J. Disp. RESOL. 81, 98.
98 See Riskin, Understanding, supra note 3, at 26-28, 29-31.
99 See id. at 32-33, 45. Two well-known authorities on mediation have told me
they do not believe that the orientation I described as facilitative-narrow exists in prac-
tice. In fact, however, the creation of the grid was greatly influenced by my extensive
exposure to such practices, in which the mediator simply directs the process in such a
way that the parties have no ready opportunities to discuss underlying interests or
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Despite these problems, I think the problem-definition contin-
uum is quite useful for bringing attention to the question of what will
be the focus or goal of a mediation.
3. The Absence of a Distinction Between Procedure and Substance
One cause of the confusion and conflation described in Part
I.B.2.b.ii is what I now see as the dominant conceptual weakness in my
writings about the old grid-their failure to distinguish between the
relationship issues. In my view, such mediators are directive as to the process and the
role of the mediator and are directive as to the problem-definition. However, when
working within that narrow problem-to understand or resolve it-their behavior is
very elicitive (facilitative in the old terminology). Thus, for example, they would ask
the lawyers questions about the strengths and weaknesses of their cases and the likely
outcomes, rather than making statements (evaluations) about such matters. And they
would not intend to direct the parties toward a particular resolution; instead, they
would try to elicit the solution from the parties. The self-determination goal holds an
important place for such mediators, but the self-determination applies to the out-
come, not the process. For an elaboration of this distinction, see Welsh, supra note 15,
at 4.
To the extent that the notion of an overall mediator approach is descriptively
useful (an idea on which I cast doubt, see infra text accompanying notes 111-17), the
facilitative-narrow approach was quite common at the time I developed the grid sys-
tem, especially in mediations involving personal injury cases in which insurance is a
major factor. (It seems likely that in the ensuing years, in non-family, court-connected
mediations, the use of evaluative interventions has become almost routine.) See
Welsh, supra note 34, at 805.
My model for the narrow-facilitative quadrant was provided by Midwest Arbitra-
tion & Mediation, then the Kansas City office of U.S. Arbitration & Mediation, which
mediated primarily personal injury claims. The mediators (or the program itself)
were very evaluative (directive) about the problem-definition; it coincided with the
problem-definition typically employed by the lawyers and claims adjusters who used
this service: how much money the defendant's insurer would pay the plaintiff, and
when. These mediators and the organization also were directive about the role of the
mediator; the mediator would not evaluate-i.e., make predictions about outcomes in
court or assess the strengths and weaknesses of either side's case or push the parties to
reach an agreement. Thus, for example, the mediators would ask the lawyers ques-
tions about the strengths and weaknesses of their cases and the likely outcomes,
rather than making statements (evaluations) about such matters. And they would not
intend to direct the parties toward a particular resolution; instead, they would try to
elicit the solution from the parties (facilitate in the old terminology). I cannot docu-
ment this by reference to any writings; however, in about 1985, 1 attended an ad-
vanced mediation training based on that model, conducted for Midwest Arbitration &
Mediation mediators by Alan Alhadeff. (Alhadeff stopped using that model some time
ago. Interview with Alan Ahadeff, Mediator, in Seattle, Wash. (April 4, 2002).) Since
that time I have twice observed mediations in which U.S. Arbitration & Mediation
mediators employed this model, and I have discussed the model with them and with
others associated with the organization.
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mediator's behavior in two aspects of mediation: (1) dealing with the
substance of the dispute (i.e., understanding and addressing substan-
tive issues); and (2) decisions that concern the procedures employed
in the mediation. Because it lacked this distinction, the system did not
recognize that the mediator's approach can be radically different in
these spheres; for example, a mediator can be very directive (evalua-
tive in the old terminology) in determining how aspects of the process
would work (e.g., whether he would provide an evaluation, or whether
private caucuses were included) and in establishing a problem-defini-
tion (say, a narrow one), but very elicitive (facilitative in the old termi-
nology) in conducting the process within these parameters.' 00 Barry
Werth's Damages, an in-depth study of a medical malpractice case, pro-
vides an excellent example of such an approach in describing the
work of mediator David Ferguson. 1° 1 Ferguson described his ap-
proach as "facilitative." 10 2 And in helping the parties to understand
and work to resolve the issue of how much the defendant's insurer
would pay the plaintiff, he was very facilitative (elicitive in the new
terminology). But, apparently, he was directive in determining an as-
pect of the process, i.e., in deciding he would not provide an evalua-
tion even though the lawyers seemed to want him to do so.' 03
Another mediator might have been elicitive as to what the mediator's
role should be, and tried to accommodate the parties' wishes for an
evaluation-either by giving one or by arranging for a neutral expert
to give one.
Similarly, some mediators are very directive about determining
the problem-definition, but elicitive in helping the parties work to-
ward a resolution. Others may be elicitive in setting the problem, but
directive in helping the parties resolve it.
My 1994 and 1996 writings on the grid largely ignored decision-
making about procedure;'11 4 they seemed to treat the mediator's ori-
100 Kovach and Love pointed toward this idea in 1998. See Kovach & Love, supra
note 14, at 94 n.128 ("A mediator can be 'directive' with respect to process decisions
without 'evaluating' the case.").
101 WERTH, supra note 37, at 313-25.
102 Id. at 299.
103 I am making some inferences here. It seems likely that since the mediator was
not a lawyer, he did not feel capable of predicting what would happen in court or
providing lesser evaluations. In addition, one of the lawyers had participated previ-
ously in a mediation with this mediator, so he may have or should have known about
the mediator's unwillingness or inability to give evaluations based on what would hap-
pen in court. And it is not entirely clear that the lawyers explicitly asked the mediator
for an evaluation.
104 But see Riskin, Understanding, supra note 3, at 33 (describing how facilitative
mediators help parties understand one another's situation).
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entation as fixed, simply a factor with which the parties had to deal,
because I wanted to underscore the problem of rigid behavior by
mediators. 10 5 I did not address how the mediator, the parties, or both
do or could or should go about deciding how the process would work
or its focus. Most other writers likewise have not paid much attention
to this issue. 10 6 Yet process decisions offer countless choices and op-
portunities for the development-or suppression-of self-determina-
tion.' 0 7  And the importance of the distinction between the
mediator's predispositions or tendencies as to substance and process
undercuts the utility of using either the old grid' 08 or its replace-
ment'0 9 to describe a mediator's general orientation toward
mediation.
4. Static Quality, Time, Other Possible Dimensions, and the Idea
of Overall Mediator Orientations
I have explained above that the grid has a static quality, which I
also acknowledged in 1996.110 In claiming that the grid depicted
overall mediator orientations, I ignored both the time dimension and
the influence of the parties and their lawyers, i.e., the dynamic, inter-
active processes that characterize many mediations."1 Because the
problem-definition and the activities of the mediator can vary from
105 Of course, I hoped that the grid would help parties and mediators negotiate
about how the process would work and its goals, and many have used it for that
purpose.
106 Prominent exceptions include Golann, supra note 5 passim; Kovach & Love,
supra note 14, at 94 n.128. Professor Lisa Bingham has approached this issue from a
more structural perspective, distinguishing between the degree of party self-determi-
nation at the system design level and in the dispute resolution process in an individ-
ual case. See Bingham, supra note 91, at 103-08.
107 See id. passim.
108 See supra Figure 2.
109 See infra Figure 3.
110 See Riskin, Understanding, supra note 3, at 35.
111 In the 1996 grid article, I wrote:
At this point, I wish to simply describe-and to describe simply-the pro-
posed system of categorization. For convenience, I sometimes will write as if
the mediator alone defines the problem and selects the strategies and tech-
niques she will employ. However, the question of how the mediator and the
parties do, can, and should determine the scope and nature of a given medi-
ation is extremely complex. Accordingly, I plan to avoid it in this Article and
address it in a subsequent work.
Riskin, Understanding, supra note 3, at 26 n.60.
In this Article, I am not quite fulfilling that promise to deal with how participants
should go about making decisions about the mediation process: I am, however, provid-
ing a system that should help them make such decisions. See infra Part II.
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moment-to-moment, using any one construction of the grid to de-
scribe an entire mediation or a mediator's approach is like using one
map to show the national boundaries in Central Europe during the
1990s. Such two-dimensional and static graphics cannot show change.
Another problem is that the grid takes account of only two
dimensions of mediator behavior. When selecting a mediator or par-
ticipating in a mediation, however, one might want to know about a
variety of mediator characteristics. These might include the media-
tor's intensity or persistence, 112 timing, 11 3 transparency, 1 4 or the ex-
tent to which the mediator employs private caucuses, listens well, uses
humor or deception, brings a dog,1 1 5 or serves food.
Recalling the insight of George Box that prefaced this Article-
"All models are wrong but some are useful"I 16-it must be obvious
from the foregoing that I now doubt the usefulness of the idea of
overall mediator orientations as a device for describing or understand-
ing a particular mediator." 17
II. THE PROPOSED NEW GRIDS AND NEW UNDERSTANDINGS
In Part I, I noted a series of problems with or limitations of the
old grid. I suggested that both the structure and terminology of the
facilitative-evaluative/role-of-the-mediator continuum have caused
confusion and that the narrow-broad/problem-definition continuum
112 David Geronemus and Margaret Shaw have identified how actively mediators
intervene in the parties' barganing. Geronemus & Shaw, supra note 60, § 35-3.
For example, if one side asks the mediator to convey an offer that the media-
tor believes may be unproductive, the mediator may respond in a variety of
ways. Arranged from the least interventionist to the most interventionist
these include: (1) conveying the offer, (2) asking questions about how the
other side will react to the offer, (3) stating the mediator's view of how the
other side will react, and (4) refusing to convey the offer unless it is
reformulated.
Id.
113 David Geronemus and Margaret Shaw have noted another important aspect of
time. Some mediators-or mediators in some programs-tend to do most of their
work before and during the mediation sessions, while others begin earlier and remain
involved, "until the case is definitively settled, adjudicated, or the parties insist that
the mediator go away." Id.
114 Michael Moffitt, Casting Light on the Black Box of Mediation: Should Mediators
Make Their Conduct More Transparent?, 13 OHIO ST.J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1 passim (1997).
115 See Robert D. Benjamin, Dogs as Conflict Mediators, 19 MEDIATION NEWS, Dec.
2000, at 10-11.
116 Box, supra note 1, at 202.
117 I do think the idea has some utility if we consider the orientations as "ideal
types," though in 1996, I did not seek to use them in that fashion. Riskin, Understand-
ing, supra note 3, at 26 n.60.
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remains useful, even though it may not be capable of describing cer-
tain kinds of mediation behaviors, and even though many commenta-
tors have ignored or misunderstood it. In addition, I suggested that
the grid misses important issues because it: fails to distinguish between
the mediator's behaviors with respect to substance and process; has a
static quality that ignores both the interactive nature of mediation
decisionmaking and the elements of time and persistence; is
grounded on the idea of overall mediator orientations-an unrealistic
notion that excludes attention to many other issues in mediator be-
havior, obscures much about what mediators do, and ignores the role
and influence of parties.
In this Part, I offer two proposals. The first revises the old grid to
deal with the terminological problem discussed above; on this "New
Old Grid," "elicitive" and "directive" fill in for "facilitative" and "evalu-
ative." The second proposal replaces both the old and the new media-
tor orientation grids with a new grid system, a series of grids meant to
address most of the problems associated with the old grid.
A. Revising the Grid: A "New Old Grid" of Mediator Orientations Using
"Directive" and "Elicitive"
For reasons given above, I believe the terms "directive" and "elici-
tive" would serve better than "evaluative" and "facilitative" to anchor
the role-of-the-mediator continuum. 18 First, they more closely ap-
proximate my goal for this continuum, which was to focus on the im-
pact of the mediator's behavior on party self-determination.' 19
Second, the term "directive" is more general and abstract than "evalu-
ative" and therefore may cover a wider range of mediator behaviors.
Figure 3 shows a "new old grid" on which the terms "directive" and
"elicitive substitute for "evaluative" and "facilitative."'120
This "New Old Grid" of mediator orientations can better help us
understand a range of mediator behaviors by focusing on the extent
to which almost any conduct by the mediator directs 21 the mediation
process, or the participants, toward a particular procedure or perspec-
tive or outcome, on the one hand or, on the other, elicits the parties'
perspectives and preferences-and then tries to honor or accommo-
date them. Thus, it gets much closer to the fundamental nature-and
118 See supra text accompanying notes 63-68.
119 See supra text accompanying notes 74-76.
120 For a discussion of problems with the facilitative-evaluative terminology, see
supra text accompanying notes 62-76.
121 See supra note 74.
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FIGURE 3. THE "NEW OLD GRID": MEDIATOR ORIENTATIONS
Role of Mediator
DIRECTIVE
Problem
Definition
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Problem
Definition
BROAD
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Role of Mediator
intent and impact-of various kinds of mediator behaviors, especially
as they affect party self-determination. 122
I do not mean to assert that all elicitive behavior enhances party
autonomy and all directive behavior undermines it. Directive media-
tor behavior almost always impairs party autonomy in the very short
run; however, sometimes it also may be essential for fostering party
autonomy. For example, a mediator may have to be directive in estab-
lishing and enforcing certain ground rules and pursuing particular
lines of inquiry in order to protect one or more of the parties' ability
to exercise their influence. 123 Using the terms "directive" and "elici-
122 Standards of practice and ethics for mediators invariably emphasize the media-
tor's obligation to foster self-determination by the parties. See, e.g., MODEL STANDARDS
OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS std. I (1994); MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY
AND DIVORCE MEDIATION std. I (2000); see also Welsh, supra note 15, at 33-57.
123 The mediator must be responsible for establishing and maintaining an envi-
ronment in which the parties can work toward a resolution, and that inevitably re-
quires that the mediator does some directing. Indeed, typically the parties will want
the mediator to do that. In my own experience, when I ask the parties whether we
should do this or that, they generally defer to me. So I elicit first, and then direct
based on the parties' wishes that I have elicited.
In a sense, a mediator cannot help directing aspects of the process. Virtually
everything the mediator does directs the parties' attention toward certain issues and,
at least temporarily, away from others. The decision about who speaks first can have a
powerful effect on determining the dominant "story" of the dispute for purposes of
the mediation. See Sara Cobb & Janet Rifkin, Neutrality as a Discursive Practice: The
DIRECTIVE DIRECTIVE
NARROW BROAD
ELICITIVE ELICITIVE
NARROW BROAD
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tive" also can help us recognize that mediators can direct (or push)
the parties toward particular outcomes through "selective facilita-
tion"-directing discussion of outcomes the mediator favors, while
not promoting discussions of outcomes the mediator does not favor-
without explicitly evaluating a particular outcome. 124
Although I proffer this "New Old Grid" of mediator orientations,
I have substantial reservations about using it, because it retains many
of the limitations of the old grid. First, the very idea of an overall
orientation could imply, to some, a kind of rigidity in a mediator, an
unwillingness to respond to circumstances. 125 Thus, it may impair the
mediator's ability, and that of the parties and their lawyers, to ap-
proach situations with an open mind. Second, as demonstrated above
in connection with the old grid, it is nearly impossible-and generally
unwise-to label a particular mediator with an overall orientation.12 6
The change in terminology does not solve this problem, as it does not
help us escape the kinds of complexities and ambiguities discussed
above in connection with the evaluative-facilitative terminology.'2 7
For example, almost every mediator will direct on some issues and
elicit on others. And nearly any move by a mediator can have both
directive and elicitive aspects or intents or effects. Thus, a mediator
might direct the parties toward a particular understanding of their
situation in order to elicit options from them. 128 Similarly, when a
mediator asks whether one party would consider a future business re-
lationship with the other, this obviously has an elicitive thrust. But
merely asking the question can be directive, too, in the sense that it
Construction and Transformation of Narratives in Community Mediation, in 11 STUDIES IN
LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 69, 71-73 (Austin Sarat & Susan S. Silbey eds., 1991).
Many mediators typically direct the order by simply asking a particular side to proceed
(usually the side that initiated the claim). But other mediators may elicit, by asking
the parties whether either would prefer to go first. We could notice a similar distinc-
tion in mediators' behavior as to the order in which to take up issues.
124 See David Greatbatch & Robert Dingwall, Selective Facilitation: Some Preliminary
Observations on a Strategy Used by Divorce Mediators, 23 LAw & Soc'y REv. 613 (1989).
Although the mediator described in this article may have evaluated a bit, see, e.g., id.
at 635, she promoted the options that she and the wife favored by directing discus-
sions toward those options and not directing discussions toward the options that the
husband favored.
125 We should acknowledge the existence of such attitudes, but not encourage
them.
126 See supra text accompanying notes 111-17.
127 See supra text accompanying notes 63-76.
128 For a fuller discussion of this issue and related ones, see infra notes 144-45 and
accompanying text.
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directs the party's attention toward a particular issue and, at least for
the moment, away from other issues.
In other words, there is a complex, dynamic quality in the rela-
tionships between directive and elicitive mediator moves. They often
travel in tandem, and a particular move can have both directive and
elicitive motives and effects. And there's more to say: Directive and
elicitive moves each contain the seeds of the other and yield to the
other. For example, as a mediator becomes very directive-say, push-
ing parties to reach an agreement-if such direction does not pro-
duce an agreement, she may need to become more elicitive in order
to allow the parties to provide their own "direction" in working out a
solution. In other words, too much directive behavior must yield to
elicitive behavior. 129
Such mediator moves also have a dynamic relationship with the
problem-definition and with the contributions of the parties. If work-
ing within a narrow focus does not produce a satisfactory agreement,
for instance, one way to deal with this would be to broaden the focus.
In some cases, the parties or lawyers would have come forward with
directive behavior of their own, e.g., insisting on playing strong roles
or defining the problem more broadly. All of this suggests, of course,
that the relationship between mediator directiveness and self-determi-
nation is often complex and sometimes hard to ascertain.
The "New Old Grid" of mediator orientations is more useful than
the old one in providing a quick overview. Yet, like the old grid, it
resembles a map that shows only major highways and large cities. On
such a map, additional information-such as smaller towns, smaller
roads, rivers, airports, recreation areas and ball parks, topography,
and weather-could inform and remind travelers of choices and deci-
sions that can enrich theirjourneys. People concerned about media-
tion-mediators, consumers, trainers, regulators-also could benefit
from maps of mediation that highlight particular issues. With this in
mind, I put forth a series of other new grids in Part II.B.' 30
129 Professor Lela Love said that she "notice [s] that direction produces resistance
and that elicitation produces requests for direction (trust)." E-mail from Lela Love,
Professor, Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, to Leonard L. Riskin, Professor,
University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law (Jan. 25, 2002) (on file with author).
Professor Valerie Sanchez has explored a similar dynamic in negotiation. See Valerie
A. Sanchez, Back to the Future of ADR Negotiating Justice and Human Needs, 18 O-1O ST.
J. ON Disp. RESOL. 669, 685-90 (2003).
Another example of the difficulty of labeling a move as directive or elicitive is a
situation in which a mediator, in working to design the mediation process, elicits from
the parties the wish that the mediator be directive as to particular issues.
130 It would be possible to prepare additional versions of the "New Old Grid" and
commentary that respond to some of its problems that I described above. However,
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B. Replacing the Mediator Orientation Grids: The "New New
Grid" System13 '
I intend the "New New Grid" System to facilitate good mediation
decisionmaking by bringing attention to two matters: an enormous
range of potential decisions in and about a mediation, and the extent
to which various participants could affect these decisions. The system
works through a series of grids that-rather than focusing exclusively
on the mediator, as did the old grids-give equal attention to all the
participants, which ordinarily means the mediator, the parties, and
the lawyers. In addition, the grids allow us to take account of time
and the potentially dynamic nature of decisionmaking.
The system makes central the idea of participant "influence" with
respect to particular issues. It provides a method for considering the
influence that participants aspire to exert, actually exert, and expect
others to exert, with respect to any of a wide range of decisions. It
does this by dividing mediation decisionmaking into three categories:
substantive, procedural, and meta-procedural.
1. Types of Decisionmaking
Substantive decisionmaking includes trying to understand substan-
tive issues, such as what happened to give rise to the dispute, and try-
ing to make agreements intended to resolve the dispute. It also
includes establishing the problem-definition, i.e., the subject of the
mediation.13 2
any grid based on mediator orientations has two inherent problems that limit its util-
ity in fostering the more refined understanding of mediation that is appropriate in
today's more sophisticated mediation environment. First, the focus on the mediator
tends to neglect the role of the parties and lawyers and the complex relationship
between what they want and do and what the mediator wants and does. Second, as I
have elaborated above, the focus on the mediator's orientation obscures what the me-
diator actually does.
131 I call this the "New New Grid" System to distinguish it from the "New Grid"
System set forth in two recent, very brief articles. See Riskin, Retiring and Replacing,
supra note 3; Riskin, Who Decides What?, supra note 3, at 22. For a listing of the various
grids I have presented, see supra note 3; for an explanation of the relationships
between the "New Grid" System and the "New New Grid" System, see infra note 138.
132 A variety of goals and problem-definitions are conceivably appropriate for a
given mediation. For a discussion of problem-definitions, see supra Part I.B.2. The
most common understanding about the goals of mediation appears in the preface to
the Joint Standards: "Mediation is a process in which an impartial third party-a me-
diator-facilitates the resolution of a dispute by promoting voluntary agreement (or
"self-determination") by the parties to the dispute." Preface to MODEL STANDARDS OF
CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (1994). Professors Robert A. Baruch Bush and Joseph Fol-
ger, however, have promoted "transformative" mediation, in which the goal is to im-
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Procedural decisionmaking means deciding what procedures will be
employed to reach or address the substantive issues. Here is a list of
potential procedural issues, which overlap to some extent.13
3
Logistics:
Location.
Time (dates, starting and ending times, number and length of
sessions).
Pre-mediation submissions.
Required or optional?
Short letters, mediation briefs, litigation or other documents.
Should submissions include: legal analyses, underlying interests,
goals for the mediation, or obstacles to achieving these goals?
Who receives the submissions: just the mediator, or all participants?
Attendance and participation:
Who attends?
Roles of lawyers, clients, experts, others.
Procedure during the mediation:
prove the parties through "empowerment and recognition." BUSH & FOLGER, supra
note 5, at 139-88. They contrast transformative mediation with mediations intended
to resolve or settle disputes, which they call "problem-solving." The California Stan-
dards recognize the independent value'of the goal of developing understanding.
They define mediation as "a process in which a neutral person or persons facilitate
communication and negotiations between the disputants to assist them in reaching a
mutually acceptable agreement, or a better understanding of each participant's interests,
needs, values, and options." STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR CALIFORNIA MEDIATORS pmbl.
(Cal. Disp. Resol. Council 2000), available at http://cdrc.net/pg2.cfm#def (emphasis
added). Recent Model Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation also
give the goal of developing understanding equal billing with the goal of reaching
agreement: "The primary role of the family mediator is to assist the participants to gain a
better understanding of their own needs and interests and the needs and interests of others and
to facilitate agreement among the participants." MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR
FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION std. 1 (2000) (emphasis added). A recent videotape
illustrates an approach to mediation-elaborated by Gary Friedman, Jack Himmel-
stein, and Robert Mnookin-that seeks to resolve conflict through developing under-
standing. Saving the Last Dance, supra note 35. Bernard Mayer helpfully describes
the following major "beliefs" about the purposes of conflict resolution: reaching an
agreement, promoting personal transformation, addressing injustices in society, de-
veloping understanding, and addressing "everyone's procedural, psychological, and
substantive interests." MAYER, supra note 64, at 108-15.
133 For an extensive discussion of how the resolution of some of these issues affects
the quality of decisionmaking, see Lande, supra note 23, at 857-79.
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Opening statements-Which side goes first? Do lawyers and clients
speak? What is the focus of these statements?
Caucuses-Whether, when, why, and how to call caucuses. Who
can call them? Whether to maintain confidentiality of
communications?
Ending the mediation. Who decides?
Expressing the agreement in writing:
Whether, when, why, how, and by whom? How formal or legally-
binding should the document be? Who decides?
Procedures for defining the problem(s) to be mediated (and/or deciding on the
purposes of the mediation):
To what extent, if any, will the problem be defined by: The parties,
e.g., through pre-mediation statements, pre-mediation briefs, or
statements made during the mediation? The mediator, e.g.,
through the questions he asks the other participants? The media-
tion program managers, designers or sponsors, implicitly or explic-
itly? All the participants, through dialogue?
Developing options:
Will it happen? If so, when, how, and by whom?134
Developing and presenting proposals:
By whom, when, how, where?
Evaluation:
Will/should the mediator evaluate or arrange for evaluation? If so,
how, what, why, and under what conditions and standards?
Reaching agreement:
Will the mediator apply pressure on the parties or lawyers to reach a
particular settlement? Settlement in general?
The mediator's role:
Will the mediator direct or elicit as to particular procedural and
substantive issues?
134 For a discussion of the costs and benefits of generating options in negotiation,
see Chris Guthrie, Panacea or Pandora's Box?: The Costs of Options in Negotiation, 88
IowA L. REv. 601 (2003).
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Will the mediator be transparent or obscure about the mediator's
behavior? 13
5
Will the mediator provide food?
Meta-procedural decisionmaking means deciding how subsequent pro-
cedural decisions will be made. The participants could make agree-
ments, for instance, about who or what would determine any of a
range of procedural issues, such as those mentioned above. 136
A series of grids appears below. Each grid deals with a particular
kind of decision and provides an example of an array of grids we
could prepare that would shed light on particular aspects of decision-
making in mediation. The concept that unifies the system is partici-
pant "influence"-the degree of influence that various participants
either aspire to exert or actually exert with respect to a particular is-
sue. On each of these grids, that concept is depicted on the north-
south continuum. The north end of that continuum shows that most
of the influence comes from the mediator; the south end shows par-
ties and lawyers exerting most of the influence. 137 The east-west axis
would depict a particular issue. Thus, the purpose of each grid in this
series is to bring attention to the influence that each participant ex-
erts (or would like to exert) with respect to a particular issue. A ge-
neric version of this grid appears in Figure 4.
2. Types of Decisionmaking Grids
Here are some examples of how grids could illuminate each of
the three kinds of decisionmaking.1 38
135 See Moffitt, supra note 114 passim (discussing the proper level of transparency
in mediations).
136 See supra text accompanying note 132.
137 I considered using "control" instead of "influence." "Control," however, seems
too strong, given the subtle ways in which participants affect the process, and one
another, and the importance of attending to the potential or actual contributions of
all participants.
138 In my previous brief efforts to produce a "new grid system," I presented only
two categories of mediation decisionmaking, which I called the mediation process
and the meta-process. See Riskin, Retiing and Replacing, supra note 3; Riskin, Who
Decides What ?, supra note 3. As I tried to explain that proposed grid system to various
audiences, however, I noticed that the two categories sometimes confused me-as
they did at least one other colleague. I think the "New New Grid" System that I pre-
sent in this Article, which uses three categories of decisionmaking-substantive, pro-
cedural, and meta-procedural-is much clearer conceptually, at least standing alone.
The two new-grid systems together, however, could engender even more confusion.
So I suggest we all forget about the "New Grid" System and use the "New New Grid"
System.
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FIGURE 4. PARTICIPANT INFLUENCE (GENERIC GRID)
MEDIATOR INFLUENCE
ISSUE ISSUE
PARTY/LAWYER INFLUENCE
a. Substantive Decisionmaking Grids
Grids of substantive decisionmaking could deal with establishing
the problem-definition or with understanding or resolving particular
substantive issues. In addressing each of these focuses, I propose the
use of two kinds of grids: one deals with participants' predispositions
as to how that issue should be resolved and who should contribute to
its resolution, 13 9 the second grid focuses on actual influence. The first
grid would depict the participants' beliefs, attitudes or aspirations
about a particular issue before the mediation or before the issue
arises. Figure 5, for example, shows participant predispositions with
respect to the substantive issue of problem-definition and their as-
sumptions about the degree of influence they would, or would like to,
exert with respect to this issue.
For those readers who are familiar with the "New Grid" System described in the
brief articles, let me explain the relationship between the "New Grid" System and the
"New New Grid" System: what I called the meta-process in the "New Grid" System
includes what, in the "New New Grid" System, I call Meta-Procedural Decisionmaking
and Procedural Decisionmaking. What I called the Mediation Process in the "New
Grid" System appears in the "New New Grid" System as Substantive Decisionmaking.
139 A predisposition differs from an orientation, as I used that term in the old grid,
in two ways. The idea of an orientation implies a certain constancy or consistency in
attitudes and practices that have a pervasive impact on a mediation. A predisposition,
however, refers to an attitude that exists at a particular moment-before the issue has
actually arisen and before any of the participants knows the predispositions of the
other participants; thus, it is inherently subject to change. In addition, a predisposi-
tion, as I use the term, applies only to a particular issue.
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FIGURE 5. SUBSTANTIVE DECISIONMAKING:
PREDISPOSITION REGARDING PROBLEM-DEFINITION
MEDIATOR INFLUENCE
Problem
Definition
NARROW
Problem
Definition
BROAD
PARTY/LAWYER INFLUENCE
Point M shows that the mediator is predisposed to a narrow prob-
lem-definition and assumes that he or she would heavily influence the
development of such a problem-definition. Point PA shows that party
A is predisposed toward a narrow problem and definition and believes
(or assumes) that he would exercise much influence in establishing
that problem-definition. PAL shows that party A's lawyer was predis-
posed toward a slightly broader problem-definition and assumed that
his influence, combined with that of the mediator, would move the
process toward it. PB shows that party B was predisposed to a broader
definition of the problem and assumed that the parties or lawyers
would exercise much influence or control over the process of reach-
ing that problem definition. PBL would show that party B's lawyer was
predisposed toward a problem-definition of the same breadth as was
party A's lawyer and expected the mediator to play the strongest role
in setting that definition.1 40
140 Notice that this grid does not make it easy to depict the expectations of a par-
ticular party or lawyer with respect to exactly who, among the parties and lawyers,
would exercise influence over this issue. It would be feasible to depict such matters by
using different colors or shades for each of the participants. This, of course, would
detract from the simplicity I am trying to retain. Moreover, the purpose of this grid is
not to accurately depict predispositions. Rather, I hope it can help participants be-
come aware of their own and each other's predispositions, and thus facilitate the pro-
cess of establishing the problem-definition.
Note, also, that this grid focuses on a particular moment in time, and it does not
explain why participants hold particular predispositions. It is not clear, for example,
the extent to which each participant's predisposition is related to assumptions about
aM
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The second kind of substantive decisionmaking grid would focus
on actual influence. For instance, grids could show the operative
problem-definition at various times during a mediation and the influ-
ences of the participants in setting that problem-definition, as illus-
trated in Figure 6.
FIGURE 6. SUBSTANTIVE DECISIONMAKING:
INFLUENCE ON PROBLEM-DEFINITION AT VARious TIMES
MEDIATOR INFLUENCE
Problem
Definition
NARROW
Problem
Definition
BROAD
PARTY/LAWYER INFLUENCE
At T1, the mediation focuses on a narrow problem, and nearly all
of the influence to develop that problem focus has come from the
mediator. At T2, the mediation has a broader scope, and although
the mediator's influence in developing that problem-definition still
predominates, the parties and lawyers also have exercised some influ-
ence. At T3, the parties and lawyers have more substantially influ-
enced the development of a broader problem-definition.
Alternatively, we could use separate grids to show the problem-
definition at various times.1 '" By using individual grids to depict par-
what others would want. Individuals' attitudes might change once they learn of the
actual attitudes of others. Still, this sort of grid should be useful in helping partici-
pants focus on their own and each others' predispositions, thereby surfacing dispari-
ties, and allow them to discuss how and when to try to reconcile divergent views.
141 Figure 5 shows a way to depict each participant's aspirations with respect to an
individual issue. Figure 6, however, does not present a way to separately identify the
influence that individual parties and lawyers actually exert. (In real mediations, it
often would be difficult or impossible to identify such influences.) I do not see this as
a particular problem, because I do not expect the grids to provide accurate depictions
of influence exerted by individual participants. Instead, I hope they will facilitate
good decisionmaking by showing how each participant theoretically could influence a
wide range of decisions.
* TI
*T2
0 T3
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ticular moments in a mediation, and considering each as a frame in a
motion picture, it would be possible to get a sense of the flow of a
mediation with respect to individual issues. 14
2
Additional grids could bring attention to understanding and
resolving particular substantive issues that fall within the problem-defi-
nition. On Figure 7, for instance, point A shows the parties or lawyers
mainly influencing the development of understanding about a particular
narrow problem, such as how much X will pay Y Point B shows the
mediator influencing the understanding of a broad problem, such as a
breakdown in professional and personal relationships between X and
FIGURE 7. SUBSTANTIVE DECISIONMAKING:
INFLUENCE ON UNDERSTANDING PARTICULAR PROBLEMS
MEDIATOR INFLUENCE
*B
NARROW BROAD
Problem Problem
*A
PARTY/LAWYER INFLUENCE
Similarly, in Figure 8, point A shows the parties or lawyers heavily
influencing the resolution of a narrow issue and point B shows the me-
diator heavily influencing the resolution of a broad issue.
142 I am grateful to my University of Missouri colleague Art Hinshaw for this sug-
gestion. In commenting on an earlier draft of this Article, Professor Nancy Welsh
wrote:
[J]ust as watching rushes enables a movie director to determine how well a
film is capturing the desired theme or mood, a series of grids that capture
key decisions made at critical moments in a mediation could and should
enable an evaluation of the extent to which party self-determination is fur-
thered by the process and the mediator.
E-mail from Nancy Welsh, Professor, The Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State
University, to Leonard L. Riskin, Professor, University of Missouri-Columbia School of
Law (Aug. 15, 2002) (on file with author).
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FIGURE 8. SUBSTANTIVE DECISIONMAKING:
INFLUENCE ON RESOLVING PARTICULAR PROBLEMS
MEDIATOR INFLUENCE
0 B
NARROW BROAD
Problem Problem
9A
PARTY/LAWYER INFLUENCE
b. Procedural Decisionmaking Grids
I intend procedural decisionmaking to include choices about a
variety of issues made before or, sometimes moment-to-moment, dur-
ing a mediation. 143 Obviously, in making procedural decisions such as
these, influence can come from mediators, parties, and participating
lawyers. Sometimes, program administrators or designers make such
procedural decisions. Some of these decisions are explicit and care-
fully determined-part of a formal dispute resolution design
process. 144
In some situations, mediators themselves direct the outcome of
certain process decisions, either before the mediation or at its incep-
tion or during the process; in terms of the "New New Grid" System, we
would say that the mediator exercised virtually all the influence over
such decisions. In other situations, the mediator might elicit the par-
ties' perspectives and desires, and make a decision that responds ei-
ther fully or partially to such party desires or perspectives. The new
grids would show that both the mediator and the parties exercised
some influence over this decision. Sometimes, the parties assert their
143 See supra text accompanying notes 133-35.
144 See Bingham, supra note 91 passim; see also CATHY COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA
SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREAT-
ING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS passim (1996).
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desires even if the mediator does not "elicit," and the new grids would
allow us to depict the influence associated with such assertions.
145
145 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, authorities commonly said that the mediator
controls the process and the parties control the outcome. My colleague John Lande
confirms my impression that this is part of the oral history of the field. Interview with
John Lande, Professor, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law, in Columbia,
Mo. (Sept. 23, 2003). The idea that the mediator controls the process has never been
quite clear to me. Most formal standards of ethics and practice do not address this
issue directly. Some that do, however, seem to assign the parties some influence over
procedural decisions. The Standards of Practice for California Mediators, for instance,
provide that "[wihile the responsibility for conducting the mediation process rests
with the Mediator in consultation with the parties, responsibility for the resolution of the
dispute rests with the parties." STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR CALIFORNIA MEDIATORS § 1
(Cal. Disp. Resol. Council 2000), available at http://cdrc.net/pg2.cfm#def (emphasis
added). But they do not clearly delineate responsibility for designing the process or
making process decisions during a mediation. The Virginia Standards of Ethics and
Professional Responsibility for Certified Mediators provides that in initiating the mediation
process:
1.c. The mediator shall also describe his style and approach to media-
tion. The parties must be given an opportunity to express their expectations
regarding the conduct of the mediation process. The parties and mediator
must include in the agreement to mediate a general statement regarding the
mediator's style and approach to mediation to which the parties have
agreed.
2.c. The mediator shall reach an understanding with the participants
regarding the procedures which may be used in mediation. This includes,
but is not limited to, the practice of separate meetings (caucus) between the
mediator and participants, the involvement of additional interested persons,
the procedural effect on any pending court case of participating in the medi-
ation process, and conditions under which mediation may be terminated by
the mediator.
STANDARDS OF ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CERTIFIED MEDIATORS, Pt.
D, §§ I.c, 2.c (Jud. Council of Va. 2002), available at http://www.courts.state.va.us/
soe/soe.htm (2002).
Michigan rules for court connected domestic relations mediation prohibit
mediators from providing evaluations unless the parties specifically request it. MICH.
CT. R. 3.216(E)(3), 2.411(B).
In actual practice a significant portion of mediation programs and mediators
tend to be quite directive about making procedural decisions. Often mediation pro-
grams simply prescribe the rules of procedure. And many mediators, for example,
simply describe their usual procedures to the parties-either before reaching an
agreement to mediate or during the first session-by way of explaining how the pro-
cess will work, essentially dominating-though perhaps without realizing it-both
procedural and meta-procedural decisionmaking. Of course, many programs and
mediators allow room for party influence, and some parties or their lawyers will exert
influence on procedural and meta-procedural issues regardless of whether the media-
tor or program expresses openness to such influence.
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Procedural decisionmaking grids could address any of a range of
procedural issues, such as those listed above. 146 Figure 9, for example,
shows the influence of the parties/lawyers and the mediator as to
whether the mediator would provide an evaluation.
FIGURE 9. PROCEDURAL DECISIONMAKING:
INFLUENCE ON EVALUATION BY MEDIATOR
MEDIATOR INFLUENCE
Mediator Mediator
Behavior Behavior
EVALUATE NOT EVALUATE
PARTY/LAWYER INFLUENCE
Another version of that grid could show predispositions around
that issue. And Figure 10 shows influences on decisionmaking about
146 See supra text accompanying notes 133-35. Professor Nancy Welsh, writing
from a slightly different perspective, has suggested the existence of a range of process
issues:
Key Procedural Issues/Decisions.
Use of caucus (predominant/not used)
Disputant (as distinguished from his/her attorney) participation in
communication and negotiation (predominant/none)
Commitment to resolution/settlement (settlement as primary goal/set-
tlement not relevant)
Key Substantive Issues/Decisions
Definition of issues (broad/narrow or single/multiple)
Selection of norms to be used to guide decisions making (mediator se-
lection of norms/disputant selection of norms)
Application of norms to disputants' claims and settlement proposals
(mediator application of norms/disputant application of norms)
Creation of settlement options (mediator creation/disputant creation)
Selection of settlement options (mediator selection/disputant
selection).
E-mail from Nancy A. Welsh, Professor, The Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania
State University, to Leonard L. Riskin, Professor, University of Missouri-Columbia
School of Law (Sept. 11, 2002) (on file with author).
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the use of private caucuses. Point A shows a decision to use caucuses
heavily that was reached through a process in which the mediator and
the parties and their lawyers exercised equal influence. Point B de-
picts a decision to have no caucuses, influenced entirely by the
mediator.
FIGURE 10. PROCEDURAL DECISIONMAKING:
INFLUENCE ON USE OF CAUCUS
MEDIATOR INFLUENCE
ALL
CAUCUS
NO
CAUCUS
PARTY/LAWYER INFLUENCE
c. Meta-Procedural Decisionmaking Grids
Meta-procedural decisionmaking refers to deciding how subse-
quent procedural decisions will be made. One major issue in meta-
procedural decisionmaking is what degree of influence various partici-
pants will have over specific procedural issues or over procedural is-
sues in general. On Figure 11, the east-west continuum shows
participant influence over procedural choices, with party/lawyer influ-
ence depicted at the west end and mediator influence depicted at the
east end. The north-south continuum depicts participant influence
over the meta-procedural decision about how much influence partici-
pants will have over subsequent procedural decisions.
Point A shows that the parties/lawyers exercised more influence
during the meta-procedural decisionmaking, and that this produced
the decision that subsequently the mediator would exercise most of
the influence over procedural issues. Point B shows the mediator ex-
erting almost all the influence in meta-procedural decisionmaking,
which determined that the parties or lawyers would exert most of the
influence over subsequent procedural choices. Point C shows that in
the meta-procedural decisionmaking, the mediator exerted slightly
B
A I III. IV.
Heavy Semi- Moderate Light
Heavy
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more influence than the parties/lawyers, and that this produced an
agreement that the parties or lawyers and mediator would have equal
influence in deciding subsequent procedural issues. And finally,
point D shows that a meta-process dominated by the parties/lawyers
also produced the outcome that the parties/lawyers and mediator
would have equal influence in making procedural choices.
FIGURE 11. META-PROCEDURAL DECISIONMAKING:
DECIDING WHO INFLUENCES PROCEDURAL DECISIONS
MEDIATOR INFLUENCE
in Meta-Process
PARTY/LAWYER
INFLUENCE
in
Procedural
Choices
MEDIATOR
INFLUENCE
in
Procedural
Choices
PARTY/LAWYER INFLUENCE
in Meta-Process
Similar meta-process grids could deal with the extent to which
various participants would influence decisions about individual proce-
dural issues, such as the use of private caucuses or mediation briefs,
mediator evaluation, or the location of the mediation; or the degrees
of influence participants would exercise over when procedural
choices would be made.
3. The "New New Grid" System in Perspective
The grids I have set forth are examples only. The system would
allow for the development of other grids for specialized purposes.
Thus, some may find it useful to produce problem-definition grids
that focus on the depth of the problem, rather than on the
breadth; 147 the extent to which the mediation would focus on various
dimensions of the conflict, such as cognitive, emotional and behav-
147 See MAYER, supra note 64, at 115.
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ioral; 148 and the extent to which the process would focus on settling
the dispute, resolving the dispute, 49 or transforming the parties. 
15
1
Other procedural decisionmaking grids could address the issue of how
and when (as opposed to whether) the mediator would evaluate, or on
questions regarding the rules under which caucuses would be
conducted.
A series of specifically focused grids, such as these, could help
foster a high degree of awareness-among mediators, parties, lawyers,
program designers, administrators, and evaluators-of the many pos-
sible issues for decision and the various degrees to which participants
could contribute to understanding or resolving such issues. This
awareness would support more active and sophisticated decision-
making in and about mediation. Such grids also could be useful in
evaluating, studying, or reflecting on completed mediations.
The new grid system divides mediation decisionmaking into three
categories-substantive, procedural, and meta-procedural-because I
find that breakdown useful and think others also will find it useful. In
other words, this system is based on a series of constructs and does not
in any sense represent a truth about how the mediation process works
or should work. And in some mediations, it will be difficult or impos-
sible to identify actual perspectives or real events that correspond to
some of the constructs in the system. Take meta-procedural decision-
making, for example. Formal meta-procedural decisionmaking ap-
pears in a range of mediations, especially those involving numerous
parties and issues of public import. 15 1 But in many mediations, there
is no explicit meta-procedural decisionmaking, i.e., no formal decision-
making about how to make procedural decisions. It is common, for
example, for the mediator or an organization that sponsors or man-
ages a mediation program to simply announce certain procedural de-
cisions-i.e., exercise all the influence. Thus, for instance, when the
United States Postal Service launched the REDRESS program, under
which thousands of employment disputes have since been mediated,
responsible officials decided that the mediations would follow a
"facilitative approach." After about a year, they enlarged the program
148 See id. at 42-46, 98-115.
149 Many commentators have distinguished settlement from resolution. See J.
Michael Keating, Jr. & Margaret L. Shaw, "Compared to What?": Defining Terms in Court-
Related ADR Programs, 6 NEGOT. J. 217 (1990) (suggesting that "settlement" typifies
judicially-hosted settlement conferences, but that "collaboration" or "resolution"
should be the goal in mediation).
150 See supra text accompanying note 140.
151 Interview with Hansjorg Schwarz, Mediator, in Berlin, F.R.G. (Aug. 5, 2003)
(discussing the Vienna, Austria airport expansion).
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and determined that the mediations would follow the "transformative"
approach elaborated by Bush and Folger.152
Sometimes, on the other hand, program designers, sponsors, or
managers make important decisions unknowingly, implicitly or indi-
rectly. Most state farm-credit mediation programs funded by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture in the 1980s, for example, provided media-
tions that were very narrow and brief.153 This happened mainly be-
cause most state programs made very little money available to support
mediators. As a result, the only mediators who could "afford" to make
bids low enough to win contracts to mediate were those who were
inclined to conduct mediations quickly, which they believed required
a narrow problem-definition.' 54
Similarly, it will often be impossible to know the actual predispo-
sitions of individual participants as to particular issues; the partici-
pants themselves may have no such predispositions or be unaware of
them. Likewise, we frequently will be unable to know the extent to
which individual participants actually intluence understanding or res-
olution of particular issues. And even if we could learn about actual
influences exerted by individual parties or lawyers, the grids are not
well suited to display-them, nor are they suited to depict them. 55
152 Bingham, supra note 91, at 113; see also Lisa B. Bingham, Mediating Employment
Disputes: Perceptions of REDRESS at the United States Postal Service, 17 REV. PUB. PERs.
ADMIN. 20 (1997) (describing the mediation program implemented by the Postal Ser-
vice and analyzing its success based on surveys of participant in the process). I do not
know the extent to which these decisions were influenced by Postal Service employees
who were not responsible for the REDRESS program.
The decision to employ a transformative approach to mediation may be both a
procedural and a substantive choice. In the transformative model, the mediator seeks
direction from the parties (in my view, through elicitive procedures); but the trans-
formative approach also puts "problem-solving" in the background, emphasizing a
goal of improving the parties. See Folger & Bush, supra note 88 passim.
153 See Leonard L. Riskin, Two Concepts of Mediation in the FmHA's Farmer-Lender
Mediation Program, 45 ADMIN. L. REv. 21, 27-30 (1993).
154 Id. The Iowa and Minnesota programs were major exceptions. Administrators
in these programs had more capacious visions of mediation-and more money and
other resources-than did other state programs. Id. In some other high-volume pro-
grams, a narrow approach may develop because of time constraints or because of the
mindsets of mediators and parties or their lawyers.
155 Although the predisposition grids lend themselves to depicting separately the
attitudes of each participant, the influence grids do not allow a simple way to distin-
guish the influence of each party and of each lawyer. In a real mediation, however,
each party and each lawyer might influence, or try to influence, the determination of
any issue in different directions. For example, in the first mediation portrayed by
Barry Werth, the plaintiffs wanted a broad problem-definition that would afford them
some recognition for how much they had suffered and how well they had coped, and
give them some understanding of what really caused the damage to their child. See
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I do not think that any of these limitations reduce the utility of
the "New New Grid" System. Its principal purpose is to shed light on
what could or did happen in a mediation, and so to facilitate-to
make more likely-wise decisionmaking. In other words, the system
invites attention to what is and what could be, in order to facilitate
decisionmaking about what should be. Thus, for instance, the grid
system points out that, implicitly or explicitly, procedural and meta-
procedural decisions get made, and that it is possible to make such
processes open and to allow all participants to exercise influence in
them. And it promotes awareness of the possibility-or likelihood-
of differing perspectives among participants, even between clients and
their lawyers.
In this Article, I do not mean to promote a particular approach to
decisionmaking in general or in a given mediation. I believe there is
often much to be gained-in terms of self-determination and the
quality of process and outcome-from establishing an explicit deci-
sionmaking process that offers the opportunity for all,.or most, partici-
pants to influence important substantive, procedural and meta-
procedural issues. And I hope that this Article encourages such
processes by enhancing awareness of decisionmaking options. But
many mediations that lack explicit decisionmaking about procedural
and meta-procedural issues work fine. A choice to make procedural
and meta-procedural decisionmaking more open and inclusive carries
costs in terms of time, energy and financial expenditures. It also
presents risks of undermining the efficiency and focus of a mediation
and the ability of a mediator to act quickly. So resolving the issue of
openness in decisionmaking requires a delicate balance. I do not seek
to make that balance, only to mention it.
WERTH, supra note 37, at 310-25. On the other hand their lawyers seemed to want a
narrow problem-definition, limited principally to what was likely to happen in court.
Id. This desire doubtless was based, at least in part, on the assumption that this was
best for the client. Id. It also seems clear that all the other participants-the media-
tor, the defendants, and their insurers and lawyers-shared the plaintiffs' lawyers'
perspective. Id.
Nancy Welsh has described the tendency among lawyers to dominate mediation
processes and to steer their clients toward narrow, financially grounded problem-defi-
nitions. Welsh, supra note 34, at 841, 855. For further discussion of divergences be-
tween lawyer and client perspectives, see ROBERT H. MNOOK1N ET AL., BEYOND
WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALs AND DIsPUTEs 69-91 (2000)
(describing principal-agent tensions in negotiation); and Leonard L. Riskin, Repre-
sented Client in Settlement Conference: The Lessons of G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph
Out Corp., 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 1059, 1099-105 (1991) (discussing divergences between
lawyer and client perspectives in mediation and settlement conferences).
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4. Uses and Limitations of the "New New Grid" System
The "New New Grid" System, though far more refined than its
predecessors, has several limitations. First, the grids in the new sys-
tem, like their precursors, are not mathematically precise in any sense.
Second, as mentioned above, it often will be impossible to know or
depict the predisposition or influence of any participant with any de-
gree of certainty. Sometimes, these attitudes or practices will rest on
what the participant assumes other participants want or expect, and
the outcomes will result from interactions between and among influ-
ences that are too complex and subtle to map, even if we could be
aware of them. Think, for instance, about a mediator who tries to
"successively reframe" the conflict, and parties who may or may not
buy into such definition in varying degrees. 156 Sometimes, too, there
will be a vast gulf between a participant's intention in these regards
and the actual effect of her or his behaviors. 57
I have considered, and abandoned, a number of ideas-some
suggested by colleagues-about how to depict the influence of indi-
vidual participants or the dynamic nature of such influences. These
have involved overlaying transparencies, each displaying the influence
of a particular participant; using different symbols or colors to denote
different participants; adding dimensions; and changing shapes. Each
of these ideas has merit, yet each seems to rob the system of the sim-
plicity that I find so valuable. Most importantly, I think the weak-
nesses in the new grid system do not impair its primary function-to
enhance understanding, facilitate clear conversations, improve deci-
sionmaking, and bring attention to the subtle relationships among
our intentions, our actions, and the effects of these actions. 158 I hope
156 See MAYER, supra note 64, at 132-39.
157 The grid can help us notice such discrepancies.
158 I have had very positive experiences using these grids in mediation training,
teaching, and practice. As aids in understanding mediation demonstrations, for ex-
ample, the new grids promote vastly more nuanced observations and discussions than
did the old grid. I have also used them in connection with mediation role-play exer-
cises. After participants read their confidential instructions, I ask them to pause and
notice their predispositions and their intentions with respect to particular issues.
Then, during the role-plays, I ring a bell to stop the action and ask the participants to
notice their intentions with respect to influence on particular issues. Discussions
among participants-during and after the role-plays-have led to rich insights about
disparities among the participants' predispositions and disparities between an individ-
ual's intentions and the impact of her actions or other participants' perceptions of
her intentions.
I have used such activities to greatest effect in specialized advanced mediation
trainings based on mindfulness, which I have co-conducted with Ferris Buck Urba-
nowski in Texas, Iowa, and California. In such progams, participants learn, through
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that the new grid system-the concepts and terminology-will pro-
duce similar benefits for participants in real mediations, enabling
them to have a more mindful, moment-to-moment awareness that will
lead to better decisionmaking.
CONCLUSION
In using these new grids, it may be helpful to view a mediation as
a journey undertaken by a group. Like the tour guide or driver and
the travelers, the mediator and the parties and their lawyers can divide
or share decisionmaking responsibilities in many ways. The grids are
maps to help the participants identify issues and understand and
make decisions about them. The old grid and the revised grid of me-
diator orientations provide limited information dealing mainly with
the mediator's orientation; thus, they place the mediator in the role
of a tour guide who follows his own vision, or his program's vision. In
the same way a brochure might help travelers select a packaged tour,
and pack for it, the mediator orientation grids (the "Old Grid" and
the "New Old Grid") can guide participants in choosing a mediator
and preparing for a mediation.
But travelers could have a variety of purposes; they might want
mainly to get to a destination, to enjoy the scenery on the way, or to
get acquainted with each other or themselves. And their wishes may
change during the trip. They might agree to go to Disneyland and
hire a bus driver or guide to take them. But if they encounter bad
weather or heavy traffic or a more appealing venue, such as a beach or
a museum; if they get into a conversation and realize that none of
them really wanted to go, but each thought the others did; if they
experience transforming insights about themselves or one another-
in any of these events, they might change their minds about where to
go or how to get there, and wind up driving to the Getty Museum in
car pools. Whether any of this will happen depends to a degree on
the extent to which all or an), of them can be aware of changing cir-
meditation practice, to pay mindful attention to their thoughts, even fleeting ones, as
well as to bodily sensations, judgments, and emotions. But the exercises described
above also work well in more conventional mediation training programs in which
participants have not had instructions or practice of mindfulness. For an overview of
how mindfulness meditation might contribute to legal and dispute resolution educa-
tion, see Leonard L. Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential Benefits of Mind-
fulness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers, and Their Clients, 7 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 1,
46-60 (2002). See generally The Initiative on Mindfulness in Law and Dispute Resolu-
tion, at http://www.law.missouri.edu/csdr/mindfulness.htm (last visited Oct. 8,
2003); Harvard Negotiation Insight Initiative, at http://www.pon.harvard.edu. (last
visited Oct. 8, 2003).
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cumstances and the possibilities of choice, and can feel flexible
enough to respond creatively. That, in turn, depends not only on the
driver or tour guide's predispositions, behavior and openness, but
also on the travelers' assertiveness and wisdom.
Plainly, the same situation exists in mediation. Often mediators
and parties and their lawyers enter mediations with particular goals
and expectations or predispositions about the mediation process.
They might want to settle a particular issue or dispute, to understand
that issue or dispute, to understand each other and themselves, or to
change each other and themselves. In a mediation, as in a journey,
goals or methods to achieve such goals can change with new learning
and circumstances. 159 A mediation, like a trip to Cannes or Quebec
or Kansas City, can be mundane, satisfying, or transforming-or all
three. 160 The decisionmaking processes in a mediation hold-or can
hold-endless opportunities for learning, changing goals and proce-
dures, and changing methods for reaching goals. The outcome de-
pends, in part, on the intentions, awareness, and flexibility of all the
participants. I hope that this "New New Grid" System will help per-
sons connected with mediation notice the vast array of important is-
sues and decide them wisely.
Yet my enthusiasm is tempered by reservations, in addition to
those I have noted above. The old grid's greatest virtue, its simplicity,
159 I agree with much of Eric Galton's assertion:
Empowerment in its truest sense is the mediator adjusting the process to
what the people in a particular dispute want out of it and hope for it. They
may hope for conciliation. They may hope just for economic settlement.
They may simply want understanding and acknowledgement. They may just
want to be heard. The imposition of a single form of mediation obliterates
its essential diversity and flexibility and may even impose a process people
don't want. In the end, it's about the people, not the mediators.
Eric Galton, The Preventable Death of Mediation, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2002, at 23,
25. But I worry about whether this statement gives sufficient attention to the role of
the mediator in helping the parties determine what they want out of the mediation.
160 I am reminded of Shel Silverstein's poem, Magic Carpet.
You have a magic carpet
That will whiz you through the air
To Spain or Maine or Africa
If you just tell it where.
So will you let it take you
Where you've never been before,
Or will you buy some drapes to match
And use it
On your
Floor?
SHEL SILVERSTEIN, Magic Carpet, in A LIGHT IN THE Aric 106 (1981).
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is also its greatest vice. The original system-based on just one static
image of the mediator's orientation-fostered valuable dialogue and
useful debate, but it also obscured our vision of many important issues
and may have prompted an unproductive polarization in the aca-
demic literature. The "New New Grid" System is much more com-
plex. I hope this complexity will produce more insight than
confusion.
I do not expect anyone to use all the new grids. Instead, I antici-
pate some will choose versions that will be helpful for a particular pur-
pose, and invent other versions for special purposes. In short, I hope
that the "New New Grid" System-both its underlying concepts and
the grids themselves-will promote more refined understandings and
dialogues about mediation, and thus help us all make wise choices
about whether, when, and how to use and structure mediation. And
finally, I do not see this as the last word. I hope, and expect, that
colleagues will critique and extend these ideas.
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